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The Future of New Zealand's Accident 
Compensation Scheme 
by Richard S. Miller-
Whenever I walk in a Wellington Street 
I'm ever so careful to watch my feet; 
For the broken glass that's scattered around 
The fruits of labourers high off the ground. 
And I squint my eyes as dust flies fast 
From another grave of a building past. 
I daren't slow down, or come to a halt, 
Or I might get hit by a flying bolt. 
If a worker's shed on a platform high, 
Should happen to catch my wary eye, 
I cross the road to miss the terror, 
As it crashes down-human error! 
I move on fast to avoid the trouble 
That's parcelled up in construction rubble, 
And masonry pieces that rocket down 
From the tower blocks that litter the town. 
And as I walk, my head's held high, 
searching for workers against the sky, 
Who watch from above and growl, "He's mine, 
As soon as he's silly and comes into line." 
So whenever I walk in a Wellington Street, 
I'm ever so careful to watch my feet. 
From Editorial, A A Milne's Wellington?1 
3 
In late 1986 and in 1987 there was in New Zealand a public furor over 
sharp increases in levies imposed on employers to support New Zealand's 
unique total non-fault accident compensation system-a furor which rivaled in 
intensity and media coveragel the tOrt and liability insurance "crisis" in the 
• Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii. The author 
wishes to thank the administration, faculty, and staff of the Faculty of Law of the Victoria Uni-
veRity of Wellington for their generosity in making their facilities available to the author during 
his Stay in New Zealand and, particularly, to thank Senior Lecturer John Miller for his comments 
on the status of proposed amendments to the Accident Compensation Act and on other related 
issues. 
t Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.>, Oct. 24, 1987, at 8, col. 1. 
I Set inf,.a notes 124-37 and accompanying text. 
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United States. It is the purpose of this article to examine the problems which 
led to the New Zealand controversy and their causes, and to discuss some solu-
. dons proposed by the New Zealand Law Commission, by me, and by others as 
well as possible implications of the New Zealand experience for reform 
elsewhere. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand Accident Compensation ActS establishes a comprehensive 
no-fault scheme (Compo) for compensating accident victims. In exchange for 
substantial benefits including virtually complete medical and rehabilitation ex-
penses, substantial wage replacement for earners whether they are injured on or 
off the job, and payment of some noneconomic losses, accident victims in New 
Zealand have largely given up their common law right to sue in tort for dam-
ages for personal injuries.4 
8 Originally Accident Compensation Act, 1972, 1 N.Z. Stat. 521 (1972), as amended. This 
act was consolidated and amended by Accident Compensation Act, 1982, 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552 
(1982), and its subsequent amendments. 
There has, of course, been considerable interest in and discussion about the Act by academics 
and practitioners both inside and outside New Zealand. See, e.g., A. BLAIR, ACCIDENT COMPENSA-
TION IN NEW ZEAlAND (1978);T. ISON. ACODENT CoMPENSATION: A CoMMENTARY ON tHE NEW 
ZEALAND SCHEME (1980) (hereinafter T. ISON); G. PA.I.MER, ACODENT CoMPENSATION: A SruDY 
OF LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEAl.A.ND AND AUSllVillA (1979) {hereinafter G. PALMER, 
ACODENT CoMPENSATION};}. STAPLETON, DISEASE AND tHE CoMPENSATION DEBATE (1986) {here-
inafter}. STAPLETON}; Henderson, The New Zealand Accident CompenJation Reform, 48 U. CHI. 1. 
REV. 781 (1981) {hereinafter Henderson}; Blair, The "Accident" of a Heart Attack, 1982 
N.Z.1.}. 199; Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CAUF. 1. 
REV. 976 (1985) {hereinafter Brown}; Fleming. IJ There a Future for Tort?, 58 Ausn. LJ. 131 
(1984); Gaskins, Tort Reform in the WeI/are State, 18 OSGooDE HAll LJ. 238 (1980); Gellhom, 
Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.s.)-Medical MiJhap Compemation (N.Z.), 73 CORNEU1. REV. 
170 (1988) {hereinafter Gellhom}; KIar, New Zealand'J Accident CompenJation Scheme: A Tort 
Lawyer'J PerJpeclivt, 33 U. TORONTO LJ. 80 (1983) {hereinafter KIar}; Love, Actiom for Non-
phyJical Harm: The RelationJhip Between the Tort SYJtem and No-Fault Compemation (With an 
EmphaJiJ on WorkerJ' CompenJation), 73 CmF. 1. REV. 857, 876-77 (1985) {hereinafter Love}; 
Miller, The Accident CompenJation Act and DamagtJ ClaimJ, 1987 N.Z.1.] 159, 184; Palmer, 
DangerouJ ProduclJ and the umumer in New Zealand, 1975 N.Z.1.}. 366; Pedrick, Palmer'J 
umpenJation for Incapacity: The New Zealand and AuJtralian "No Fault" Story, 1981 UTAH 1. 
REV. 115; Vennell, Informed Conunt or ReaJonable DiJc!oJure of RiJkJ: The Relevance of an In-
formed Patient in the Light of the New Zealand Accident CompenJation Scheme, 13 N.Z.R.L. 160 
(1987) {hereinafter Vennell, Informed ConJent}; Vennell, ProblemJ of New Zealand'J No-Fault Ac-
cident CompenJation Scheme, 22 LAw Soc. }. 44 (1984); Vennell, Unlocking the Turntable, 1975 
N.Z.L.]. 277; Vennell, Some Kiwi Kite-Flying, 1975 N.Z.L.]. 254. 
• Accident victims retain their rights to sue for punitive damages, Jee infra note 205 and 
accompanying text, and there may remain a residual right of some medical malpractice victims 
who are found not to have suffered "injury by accident" or "medical misadventure" co bring a 
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There can be no doubt that Compo achieves significant compensation goals 
which are dearly not well served by the common law tort liability system: virtu-
ally all accident victims are covered; all reasonable medical and rehabilitation 
needs are provided; wage replacement for injured earners is substan-
tial-amounting to eighty percent of the earnings loss for most earners, continu-
ing if necessary until retirement; and compensation for most victims is promptly 
paid when and as needed:' 
On the other hand, other goals-deterrence of accidents6 and justice and 
fairness in the settlement of disputes arising from accidents-as well as other 
significant but less well recognized benefits of the common law system, are 
poorly served by Compo or not served at all. 
The reasons for these differences are, of course, that on the one hand the 
common law tort liability system, particularly insofar as it is based on negli-
gence, does not purport to be a compensation system, except conditionally and 
incidentally,7 and, on the other hand, that Compo is intended to serve primarily 
as a compensation system. Indeed, Compo does not purport to serve justice 
goals at all nor does it serve accident prevention goals (except in the most atten-
uated and insignificant way) though it pretends to do SO. 8 
Nevertheless, if the common law system, as some have alleged, serves deter-
rence goals poorly or not at all, then arguably it would also follow that because 
of its heavy costs it should be replaced by a system like Compo,e notwithstand-
ing the extent to which the common law might serve justice or other goals in 
some instances. In that event the game (tort liability) would probably still not 
be worth the candle. Conversely, however, it would be even greater folly to 
adopt Compo and concurrently scrap the common law system, as New Zealand 
has done, until either the ineffectiveness of the tort system as a deterrent to 
common law action. See Vennell, Informed ConJmt, Jupra note 3. 
& See infra text accompanying notes 16-66. 
6 See infra notes 189-246 and accompanying text. 
7 G. PALMER, ACOOENT COMPENSATION, Jupra note 3, at 35; Miller, The Scope of Liability for 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional DiJtreJJ: Making "The PuniJhment Fit the Crime", 1 U. HAW. 1. 
REV. I, 23 (1979.). Cf Owen, Deterrence and Dmrt in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAuF. 1. REV. 665, 
674 (1985). See Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Mass. 1949) ("Ton law, like its 
younger brother criminal law, was sired by a policy of regulating the social order and substituting 
legal process for self-help. To be sure, ton law also always has a compensatory element. But that 
is of secondary consequence .... ") (Wyzanski, DJ.) (citation omitted). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 188-203. 
9 See Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAllF. 1. REV. 555 (1985) [hereinafter 
Sugarman}. See generally SympoJium: Alternatille CompenJation Schemel and Tort Theory, 73 CAuF. 
1. REV. 548 (1985). C/ Zuckerman, Tort Reform, u.s. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 7, 1987, at 
68 (recommending adoption in the United States of a no-fault accident compensation scheme like 
New Zealand·s). 
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accidents has been demonstratedlO or until a reasonably well-tested accident pre-
vention alternative is in place. 
Ideally, since Compo has been in operation in New Zealand since 1974, we 
should have had the data necessary to assess whether elimination of the com-
mon law tort system has in fact had any impact on accident rates. Unfortu-
nately, however, the data is not available. ll The only study to datel2 seems 
inconclusive at best and there are reasons to question even its tentative 
conclusions. 13 
It is my principal thesis that the almost complete abolition of tort liability for 
personal injury in New Zealand has led to a serious failure of deterrence, to an 
increase in accidents and accident rates which has probably contributed signifi-
cantly to a sharp increase in the costs of Compo, and to the attendant public 
crisis. Based upon this thesis, I have proposed that the tort system be reintro-
duced in New Zealand to supplement Compo. This proposal, contained in a 
submission in 1987 to the New Zealand Law Commission,l4 is described and 
discussed below along with the Law Commission's own recent proposals for 
reform of Compo. Finally, the New Zealand experience will be discussed in 
10 There is reason to believe that the tort system as it existed in New Zealand prior to the 
adoption of Compo was in fact faidy ineffectual as a deterrent to accidents. Thus, for example, in 
1967 only nine million dollars was spent by owners of motor vehicles in New Zealand for com-
pulsory third-party insurance. THE ROYAL CoMMISSION OF INQUIRY. CoMPENSATION FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND 229 app. (1967) (hereinafter WOODHOUSE REPORT]. And in 
1970 compulsory third-parry auto insurance for a private motor vehicle was only $7.90 per year. 
G. PALMER, ACODENT CoMPENSATION, sup,.a note 3, at 83. This may have been the result of a 
system where there is no contingent fee allowed in personal injury cases, where the losing party is 
chargeable with COSts, including legal fees of the winning party, and where there is therefore 
significant financial hazard to pursuing a personal injury action and little risk in being inade-
quately insured. Under such a system there may be little direct deterrence by way of individual 
concem for the consequence of liability and lirtle by way of general deterrence to raise the COSt of 
driving. If this is correa, then the advent of Compo and the elimination of the personal injuty 
tort action would not have had an important impact on deterrence, of which there was vety little 
even before Compo. 
Indeed, while commenting during a faculty seminar led by the author at Victoria University on 
his perception that Wellington was an unusually unsafe and hazardous place and suggesting that 
the absence of a tOrt action may have reduced or eliminated the motivation for safety, a senior 
staff member of the Law Commission remarked that New Zealand had always been that way, 
even before Compo. 
11 G. PALMER, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, sup,.a note 3, at 378-80; Btown, sup,.a note 3, at 
980. 
12 Brown, supra note 3, at 960. 
18 See infra note 325. 
14 Submission by R. Miller to the Director, New Zealand Law Commission, on the New 
Zealand accident compensation scheme, (May 15, 1987) (hereinafter Submission to Law Com-
mission] (available in Faculty of Law Library, Victoria University of Wellington). See a/so Miller, 
Plugging the ACe's Biggest Leak, Nat'l Bus. Rev., July 24, 1987, at 17, col. 1. 
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relation to the ongoing debate on tort reform in the United States. 
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 
While the details of Compo have been well-described elsewhere,1& a sum-
mary of its basic features and its policy objectives, particularly as compared with 
the common law tort/liability insurance system, will prove useful here. 
A. Major Features 
In general, Compo provides compensation, without regard to fault, to New 
Zealanders and to others present in New Zealand who suffer personal injury or 
death as a result of "injury by accident."16 The Act, however, prohibits com-
mon law tOrt actions to recover compensatory damages for personal injury or 
death covered by Compo; that is, caused by "injury by accident."17 What con-
stitutes an accident, for purposes of the Act, is determined from the victim's 
point of view. Thus, injuries caused by intentional torts as well as injuries 
caused by negligence, medical misadventure (including most medical malprac-
tice), product defect, and pure accident are covered along with certain industrial 
diseases and industrial deafness.18 In consequence, Compos' coverage for non-
illness caused injuries and disablement is almost universal, excluding only some 
self-inflicted injuries, some injuries caused in the commission of a crime, and, 
possibly, some adverse consequences of medical treatment and of failure by a 
medical professional to diagnose illness or to secure an informed consent. IS The 
corollary is that the abolition of tort actions to recover damages for personal 
injuries is, likewise, virtually complete. 
1. Benefits 
Benefits under the scheme fall into five categories: earnings-related compensa-
tion (ERC), medical expenses, rehabilitation expenses, noneconomic losses, and 
other miscellaneous costs of accidents. 
18 See, t.g., G. PALMER. ACOOENT CoMPENSATION, supra note 3; Henderson, sup,.a note 3. 
II Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 26. 
17 la. S 27. 
18 Set generally G. PALMER, ACOOENT COMPENSATION, supra note 3, at 249-62; T. IsoN. supra 
note 3, a[ 18-39. 
Itl Vennell, lnfonnea Consent, supra note 3. 
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a. Earnings-Related Compensation20 
In general, the Act provides for payment of eighty percent of lost wages or 
earnings after the first week of incapacity for earners (including the self-em-
ployed) whether they are injured on or off the job. Where the injury is work-
related the employer must pay the first week's ERe. There is a ceiling on the 
total amount of wages eligible for ERC, which translates into a weekly maxi-
mum of ERC payments. As of June, 1987, the maximum payment was $97621 
per week. 
ERC may continue as long as needed until retirement age. 22 Of particular 
interest is a provision, designed to insure that the receipt of ERC in lieu of 
wages does not discourage rehabilitation, which prohibits a reduction in ERC, 
even though the victim's earning capacity increaseJ, once a assessment is made by 
the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC)23 that an earner is permanently 
disabled. 24 Once an earner has been deemed permanently incapacitated, he or 
she may be entitled to periodic percentage increases in weekly ERC payments, 
ordinarily based upon increases in the cost of living.2Ii While such increases 
have not necessarily kept pace with the cost of living, they have been fairly 
generous.28 
While New Zealand earners are thus entitled to rather fulsome benefits to 
compensate for their lost earnings, others who suffer injury by accident either do 
not receive ERC or may receive benefits which fall well below their actual earn-
ing capacity. These include visitors to New Zealand27 and those, such as house-
wives, children, the elderly, and the long-time unemployed who, notwithstand-
ing their earning capacity, either do not have earnings or have only meager 
20 See Accident Compensation Act, 1982, §§ 52-71, as amended. 
21 ACODENT CoMPENSATION CORPORATION, UNINTENTIONAL INJURY: NEW ZEALAND'S ACCI· 
DENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 32 (1987) [hereinafter UNINTENTIONAL INJURY]. Except where oth-
erwise indicated, dollar amounts are in New Zealand dollars. At the times referred to in this 
article the exchange rate was about N.Z.$l.OO = U.S.$0.58 or 0.59. 
II Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 66. The date of termination of ERC benefits may vary 
according to the age of the earner at the time of the accident and the earner's retirement age. 
New Zealand provides significant retirement benefits (superannuation) for New Zealand workers. 
28 The Accident Compensation Corporation is a governmental entity which administers the 
Accident Compensation Act. Id. §§ 4-10. 
24 [d. § 60(5). Note that increases in weekly compensation are permitted where it is deter-
mined that the capacity of a person deemed permanently incapacitated has deteriorated. [d. § 
60(4). 
2& [d. § 60(7). These increases are efFected through Orders in Council issued by the Governor-
General on the recommendation of the Government. 
28 See, e.g., Order in Council 1986/130 (June 30, 1986) (11.25 percent); id., 1987 (May 15, 
1987) (9.4 percent). 
'7 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 52(2)(j). 
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earnings at the time of their injuries.28 
b. Medical, Hospital, and Other Related Expense! 
Virtually all medical and surgical treatment, hospital care, and pharmaceuti-
cals required as a result of an injury by accident will be provided or reimbursed 
either under the general social securiry system of New Zealand, by the ACC, or 
by both.29 The public health system generally provides very low fees to physi-
cians (about $14.25 per visit)SO and its hospital system has been subject to 
considerable complaint. SI Compo covers the amounts of medical costs in excess 
of those paid by the Social Securiry system up to a total which the ACC deter-
mines are "reasonable by New Zealand standards.',s2 
While the medical benefits paid through Compo are generally more complete 
and allow wider options than the public health system, including private hospi-
talization and private surgeons,ss the availabiliry and utilization of public health 
benefits for accident victims makes its virtually impossible to tally the health 
care costs attributable to accidents. That is, medical costS of accidents may be 
covered by the social security system and never identified as accident costs. S4 
28 Special provision is made for calculating the payment of ERC to employees or apprentices 
who suffer accident while under the age of 20 and who would have earned greater amounts after 
age 20, id. § 62, and to those who suffer "any loss of potential earning capacity," id. § 63. The 
latter provision, however, only applies to those who, at the time of the accident, are under the age 
of 16 or to those who were or had been actively engaged in studying or training for an occupa-
tion, career, or profession and were about to embark upon it. [d. § 63(l)(c). It then sets the 
earnings of such persons at a prescribed amount (subject to a discretionary fifty percent increase 
for a patticular individual) which may provide a considerably lower ERC than might be earned if 
the victim's actual potential earning capacity were realized. Id. §§ 63(2), (5). 
29 UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, IIlpra note 21, at 46-47. 
ao See LAw COMMISSION, REPORT NO.4: PERSONAL INJURY: PREVENTION AND RECOVERY, RE-
PORT ON THE ACODENT COMPENSATION ScHEME para. 174 (1988) [hereinafter SECOND WOOD-
HOUSE REPORT}. The usual fees are about $22 per visit. Id. 
al See, e.g., Busby, Bed crisis looms-Hospital room 'appalling', Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), 
May 8, 1987, at 10, col. 6. 
32 Accident Compensation Aer, 1982, § 75(l)(b); UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 21, at 
46. 
33 Requests for admission to private hospitals have to be specially made to the ACC and 
approved. The ACC takes the following position: "The Corporation . . . is of the opinion that 
the public system copes well with urgent surgety. It believes that admission of ACC clients to 
private hospitals should only be for non-urgent surgety, and even then only when adequate ar-
rangements cannot be made for surgety in the public system." UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra 
note 21, at 47. 
a. See ACCIDENT CoMPENSATION CORPORATION, CoMPENSATED ACODENTS FOR THE YEAR EN-
DED 31 MARCH 1988 1 (1988) (excluding from the accident statistics for 1988 accidents result-
ing only in medical treatment for which the physician is reimbursed directly by the social security 
system). 
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Conversely, the system of accounting and paying medical care providers for 
medical costs of accidents is not tightly controlled; physicians generally deter-
mine for themselves whether particular patients are being treated for injury by 
accident and bulk-bill the ACC for such treatment.8& It is highly probable, 
therefore, that some medical costs which are reported and paid by the ACC as 
arising from accidents may in fact have arisen from causes, such as illness, 
which are not covered by Compo. 
Other medically-related accident expenses which are paid by ACC for acci-
dent victims include dental treatment,36 travel expenses to secure medical treat-
ment,37 and damage to artificial limbs, glasses, or clothing.36 
c. Rehabilitation Expenses 
The ACC is given broad responsibility for promoting the complete rehabilita-
tion of accident victims.38 . Its function in practice is best stated in its own 
words: 
In broad terms the total rehabilitation process may encompass medical and 
paramedical, vocational, social, financial security and family requirements. It is a 
total process that unfolds over time and involves input from many sources. The 
rehabilitation services provided by the Corporation is but a segment of this pro-
cess. A primary role of the Corporation is to make the connections between the 
injured person and the existing resources and services and, in so doing, provide 
the basis for informed choice. 
ACe's rehabilitation coordinators help injured persons to assess their needs and 
examine the possible options so that a personal choice can be made. The ideal is 
to achieve independent living on the part of the injured person. Once the needs 
have been assessed, the coordinators ensure that those needs are met to the fullest 
extent possible. Where necessary the ACC may become a direct provider of re-
sources through financial assistance for housing alterations, motor vehicle adap-
tions, restraining programmes and the provision of aids for daily living.40 
ao Cf Accident Compensation Act, 1982, §§ 75(5) and (6) which, in the cases of certified 
medical practitioners and qualified radiologisrs, physical therapists, and providers of other 
paramedical services, authorizes the ACC to pay for their services "without further inquiry as to 
whether or not the services were required as a result of personal injury by accident" where the 
practitioner who has provided or authorized the other providers to furnish services has certified 
"that he considers that the services were required as a result of personal injury by accident 
... " Id. 
se Id. § 76. 
a7 Id. §§ 72-74. 
se Id. § 77. 
ae Id. §§ 36, 37. 
40 UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 21, at 65, 66. 
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d. Noneconomic Losses 
Because Compo surrendered potentially large awards under the common law 
damage action in exchange for adequate and cenain, but less bonanza-like, 
compensation, there has from the beginning been a demand from labor unions 
to retain and indeed to increase lump sum awards for noneconomic losses to 
replace some of the ton damages which have been given up." From the begin-
ning, therefore, the Act has allowed payment of lump sums, in addition to 
other compensation for actual economic losses, for "permanent loss or impair-
ment of any bodily function (including the loss of any pan of the body)"42, and 
for pain and suffering, loss of amenities, disfigurement, and loss of capacity for 
enjoying life.48 For non-earners, these noneconomic losses may constitute the 
principal compensation, other than medical expenses, paid for disabling 
accidents. 
Currently, the permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function is compen-
sated on the basis of a schedule appended to the Accident Compensation Act.44 
The maximum payable here is $17,000.411 Assessment of the amount of pay-
ment for pain and suffering, disfigurement and loss of enjoyment or amenities 
of life is "a subjective and discretionary matter."46 The maximum award for 
this category is $10,000.47 Payments may be made from both categories to a 
single victim, $27,000 being the maximum award. However, no payments 
under these categories for noneconomic loss may be made unless the victim 
survives the accident by twenty-eight days. Moreover, entitlement to such pay-
ments do nOt survive the death of the victim.48 
e. Miscellaneous Benefits 
Other benefits payable by Compo include: 
(1) ERC to the surviving dependent family members of an earner49 who dies 
41 G. PALMER, ACOOENT CoMPENSATION. supra note 3, at 129. Prior to Compo, workers were 
entitled to bring common law actions against their employers and also to seek workers' compensa-
tion. ld. at 26 . 
•• Accident Compensation Act, 1982, S 78 . 
• s ld. § 79. 
•• ld. at 140 (first schedule). 
4D ld. § 78 . 
•• UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 21, at 58. 
47 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, S 79(1) . 
•• ld. § 78(9) (impairment); id. S 79(6) (pain and suffering, etc.) . 
•• A person who, not being married to the earner, "cohabited [with him or her] immediately 
preceding the date of the deceased person, and, in the opinion of the Corporation, . . . entered 
into a relationship in the narure of marriage" with the deceased person is included within the 
definition of "spouse." ld. § 65(1). 
12 University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 11: 1 
as a result of injury by accident. IIO The surviving spouse is entitled to receive up 
to three-fifths of the deceased earner's ERC, payable until the earner's entitle-
ment to ERC would have ended or upon the death or remarriage of the depen-
dent spouse. III Dependent children are each entitled to receive up to one-fifth of 
the deceased parent's ERC if one parent remains alivell2 or two-fifths if both 
have died. as Dependents of the deceased earner other than the spouse or surviv-
ing children may also be entitled to receive ERe in amounts similar to those 
available to a surviving spouse or child. 114 
(2) Compensation, in such amounts as the ACC "thinks fit for actual and 
reasonable expenses and proved losses necessarily and directly resulting from the 
[accident victim's) injury or death ... ,"1111 There are a number of specific 
exclusions applicable to this provision, such as property damage,1I8 the opportu-
nity to make a profit,1I7 and losses arising from inability to perform a contract,1I8 
but it is not clear what is included. 
(3) Compensation to members of the accident victim's household for substi-
tute household or domestic services to replace those previously provided by the 
victim. Ie 
(4) Compensation for losses or expenses incurred by a person in rendering 
help to the accident victim or "in taking any necessary action following and 
consequential upon the death of the injured person. "80 
(5) Compensation for "constant personal artention" for the victim where 
such attendant care is necessary.8l 
(6) Compensation for loss of pension or annuity rights upon which the claim-
50 Id. § 65. 
51 Id. § 65(2)(a). When a dependent widow or widower remarries, he or she is entitled, if 
under 63 years of age, to receive a lump sum equal to two year's of the ERe payments that 
would have been payable to him or her had there been no remarriage. Id. § 70. 
51 Id. § 65(2)(b). 
58 Id. § 65(4). 
54 Id. § 65(2)(c). 
55 Id. § 80(1). 
118 Id. § 80( J)(a). 
57 Id. § 80( J)(d). 
58 Id. § 80( J)(e). 
58 Id. § 80(2)(a). 
80 Id. § 80(2)(b). "This provision has been interpreted as covering the cost, inter alia, of 
hospital visits to give help to the injured person, or of home help to the person in convalescence. 
But the emphasis . . . is on giving help to the injured person, and unless it can be said, for 
example in the case of hospital visits, that they had a definite therapeutic purpose in giving 
'help', the expenses cannot be claimed." UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, Iupra note 21, at 52. 
81 Id. at (3). "It has been held (Accident CMnpemation Appeal Authority: Decilion 59~) that 
such compensation is limited to cases where the incapacity is so grave that the person is incapable 
of care for himself/herself and requires, as a matter of necessity, constant personal attention." 
UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, Iupra note 21, at 52. 
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ant was dependent, caused by the death of the accident victim.62 
(7) Compensation for funeral expenses for accident victims.63 
13 
(8) Lump sum payments. In the event of death as a result of personal injury 
by accident, the surviving spouse, if totally dependent on the deceased, receives 
a lump sum of $4,000; partially dependent spouses may receive lesser sums.64 
Surviving dependent children likewise receive up to $2,000 each.60 These pay-
ments are completely independent of any other benefits which may be payable 
on account of the victim's death.6s 
2. Funding Sources 
Compo is funded from three different sources: Levies upon employers and 
self-employeds based upon size of payroll (earnets account},67 levies upon auto-
mobile owners (motor vehicle account},68 and general revenues (supplementary 
account). 
The largest source, paying approximately sixty-six percent of the total cost of 
Compo,69 and the source which has been most responsible for the creation of 
the outcry and potential crisis for Compo has been the earners account. All 
payments of compensation to earners who suffer accidents, on or off the job,70 
except for motor vehicle accidents, come exclusively from the earners account. 
And all income to the earners account comes from levies upon employers based 
upon the size of their payrolls.71 These levies, in rum, are composed of three 
elements: variable levies related to the costs of on-the-job injuries of workers in 
each of 103 separate industrial activity classes; flat rate levies related to non-
work injuries of all earners in all industrial classes; and a flat rate to fund the 
Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare programme of the Department of 
Labour. 
81 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, S 80(4). 
83 Id. § 81. The expenses covered must be "reasonable by New Zealand standards." Id. 
e. Id. § 82(a). 
88 Id. § 82(b). 
88 UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, slIpra note 21, at 55. 
87 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, §S 38-46. 
88 Id. §§ 47, 48. 
8e REPORT OF THE ACODENT CoMPENSATION CoRPORATION FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 
1987, 9 (1987) {hereinafter 1987 ACC ANNUAL REPORT]. 
70 For each of the five years from 1982 through 1987, work accidents accounted for approxi-
mately 56 percent and non-work accidents for about 44 percent of costs of accidents to earners 
(not considering accidents involving motor vehicles). id. 
71 Only leviable earnings are considered. That is, since the maximum earnings which any 
earner can consider for purposes of earnings related compensation was, in 1987, $64,458 per 
year, earnings of an earner in excess of that amount were not considered in computing the 
amount of payroll subject to levy. Id. at 22. 
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For 1988-89, levy rates were set from a low of $1.30 to a high of $27.25 
per hundred dollars of payroll.72 While self-employed persons had been paying 
a flat rate levy which, in June, 1987, amounted to $3.75 per one hundred 
dollars of earnings,73 they, too, are now being assessed according to the class of 
industrial activity in which their work falls.7• 
It is particularly important to note, for the purposes of this article, that levies 
for the earners account, which becomes the sale source of Compo benefits for all 
earners who suffer accidents (other than those involving a motor vehicle,) are 
paid by employers based upon the size of their payrolls. While levies for work-
based accidents are related to the accident COSt experience of each of the 103 
classes of industrial activity, there is no necessaty relationship between the 
amount of the levy paid or the levy rate, on the one hand, and the accident-
causing propensities of the particular employer, either with respect to his own 
employees or to third persons, on the other. A particularly stark example is the 
levy paid by physicians, which in the 1988-89 levy structure was set at $1.45 
per one hundred dollars of payroll.76 This is the same rate as that paid by 
employers of teachers.7s Obviously, there is no artempt to charge physi-
cians-or anyone else-with the costs of injuries, through negligence or other-
wise, that they may cause to those who are not their employees. 
The second largest source of funding, covering about twenty-one percent of 
the total COSts of Compo,77 is the motor vehicle account. This account covers 
injuries to victims of all accidents involving motor vehicles, whether work-con-
nected or not. Each motor vehicle owner is required to pay a levy as part of the 
annual vehicle registration fee. As of November, 1987, the levies were either 
$25.30 for small motorcycles, tractors, and vintage motor cars, for example, or 
$100 for automobiles, busses and other larger vehicles.7s While the Accident 
Compensation Act authorizes levies on motor vehicle drivers,79 that authority 
has so far not been used.80 
The supplementary account covers injuty costs from accidents, other than 
those involving motor vehicles, suffered by non-earners. This account also covers 
costs of accidents to visitors to New Zealand.8 } These costs are paid by the 
71 See ACCIDENT CoMPENSATION CoRPORATION, A GUIDE TO TIlE 1988/89 ACC lEvY STRUC-
TURE 15-17 (988) [hereinafter GUIDE TO ACC LEVY STRUCTURE). 
78 [d. at 23. 
74 [d. at 13. 
7& [d. at 33. 
78 [d. at 25. 
77 1987 ACC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 9. 
78 UNINTENTIONAL INJURY. supra note 21, at 24, 25. 
79 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 49. 
80 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 239. 
81 Visitors are nOt entitled to recover ERe. UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 21, at 26. 
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government from general tax revenues.82 
B. Goals and Policies of Compo 
Rt. Hon. Sir Owen Woodhouse, the distinguished New Zealand judge who 
may rightly be called the father of Compo, insists that Compo is not an insur-
ance scheme, but a program of social insurance.88 In order to assess the success 
or failure of the system, or to compare it with other systems, it is necessary to 
identify and to discuss in more detail the specific goals sought to be achieved. 
These goals or objectives have been admirably set fonh from the beginning of 
Compo.84 They continue to receive suppon from those in governmental 
power. 811 They are: 
l. Community Responsibility. This principle involves a recognition that it is in 
the national interest to recognize an obligation in the entire society to protect all 
citizens "from the burden of sudden individual losses when their ability to 
contribute to the general welfare by their work has been interrupted by physical 
incapacity. "88 
It is evident that this obligation, as it has been described, does not end with 
compensation to those whose ability to contribute has been interrupted by in-
jury by accident; it extends equally to those who cannot contribute because of 
incapacity caused by illness, as well. In its current form, however, as described 
above, Compo only covers some industrial diseases.87 The decision to concen-
trate on accidental injuries was evidently a pragmatic one. While recognizing 
that the scheme ought to benefit those incapacitated by illness, and hoping that 
it would one day be so extended, the framers of Compo considered economic 
factors-including the costS of covering all incapacity and the belief that the 
costs of the former tort/liability insurance system could go a long way to fi-
nance Compo for accident victims88-in their decision to limit coverage princi-
pally to accidents.89 However, as time passes since the coming into force of the 
82 Id. at 25, 26. 
83 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 44. 
8< See WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, patas. 55-63. 
8ft See, e.g., the Terms of Reference for the Law Commission's most recent report, SECOND 
WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at viii. See also). CHAPMAN. ). GOURLEY, P. JONES. ). 
MARTIN. V. MOREL & D. SMITH, 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIAlS COMMITTEE OF THE ACCIDENT COMPEN-
SATION SCHEME. 2-3 (1986) {hereinafter REVIEW BY OFFICIAlS CoMMITTEE} (Introductory letter of 
Submission). 
86 WOODHOUSE REPORT. supra note 10, para. 55. 
87 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, §§ 27-29. 
88 See WOODHOUSE REPORT. supra note 10, paras. 461-465. 
89 See id. at 113-14. 
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original Act90 and the memory of the fault system and the underlying tradeoff 
fades, the anomaly of providing generous benefits for accident victims and only 
minimal subsistence benefits for illness victims becomes more apparent and cre-
ates more pressure for modifying Compo to accommodate all incapacitated vic-
tims of accident and illness.9l No one has put it better than Geoffrey Palmer: 
Is it possible or desirable to restrict earnings-related benefits to accidental injury 
alone? If the injury being compensated were work-related injury only, the distinc-
tion might be easier to make. But twenty-four hour cover for all injury brings up 
starkly the distinction with sickness and disease. How can the man with cancer 
be treated less generously than the man who was hun in a motor accident? It is 
hard to find a persuasive argument against the proposition that people with simi-
lar incapacities should be treated the same way whether the origin of their trouble 
was accident or disease, including congenital incapacity.lIlI 
2. Comprehensive Entitlement. This principle refers to the goal of providing 
compensation to all injured persons "on the same uniform method of assess-
ment, regardless of the causes which gave rise to their injuries. "93 The intent 
here was to reject basing the right to compensation on proof of fault or upon 
other compensation systems, such as workers' compensation, which distin-
guished among the causes for incapacity.94 Again, this goal, as well as goal 1, 
above, might have embraced incapacity by illness as well as by accidental injury. 
3. Compleie Rehabilitation. This principle requires going beyond mere restora-
tion of economic losses of incapacity "to encourage every injured worker to 
recover the maximum degree of bodily health and vocational utility in a mini-
mum of time.' '911 The adoption of this goal also reflected a criticism of the 
dynamics and delays of the fault system, which had been alleged to encourage 
90 The original Act came into force in 1974. It was enacted in 1972. SECOND WOODHOUSE 
REPORT. Jupra note 30, para. 1. 
81 C/ SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30, paras. 6, 7. 
82 G. PALMER. AcaDENT COMPENSATION. Jupra note 3, at 327. Questions might also be raised 
as to whether capable persons who are unable to find work, through the "accident" of adverse 
economic conditions or plant closings, are not equally deserving of compensation under this prin-
ciple. See also id. at 328; ]. STAPLETON, Jupra note 3, at 180-83; and Hide & Ackroyd, Liability 
and the Control of HazardouJ Technology, 1988 N.Z.L.). 277, 278 ("(I]f the community is to be 
responsible for those who are incapacitated, that responsibility should arguably be placed directly 
with all taxpayers; and if the aim is comprehensive entitlement, that cover should arguably be 
extended to include all incapacity, whether it is the result of accident or illness. The logical policy 
for community provision of comprehensive cover for incapacity iJ a taxpayer funded minimum wage.") 
(emphasis added). 
83 WOODHOUSE REPORT. Jupra note 10, para. 55 . 
... 1d. para. 42. 
8& 1d. para. 58. 
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malingering and to discourage rehabilitation.96 
One particularly interesting manifestation of this principle is the provision in 
the current Act,97 which mandates that once the ACC has assessed a person as 
permanently disabled, his or her ERC cannot thereafter be reduced "by reason 
of any increase in his earning capacity."98 
4. Real Compensation. This principle mainly requires that the level of com-
pensation be based on the goal of income maintenance-actual earnings-rather 
than on the social welfare approach of minimum subsistence. It also encom-
passes "recognition of the plain fact that any permanent bodily impairment is a 
loss in itself regardleJJ of its effect on earning capacity. "99 The latter point pro-
vides support for the vety expensive proposition that compensation for 
noneconomic losses is justified in addition to ERC. loO 
5. Administrative Efficiency. The adoption of this goal also reflected dissatis-
faction with the fault system. "It looks to evenness and method in every aspect 
of assessment, adjudication, and administration. The collection of funds and 
their distribution as benefits should be handled speedily, consistently, economi-
cally, and without contention,"IOI In practice, however, the beneficial effea of 
providing benefits promptly and without "hassle" seems to have been accompa-
nied by a loss of control over what in fact is being paid for. Thus, for example, 
relying upon physicians to determine whether their patients' conditions are pro-
duced by accident or illness for purposes of determining whether to pay medical 
expenses largely removes that important question from the ACC's contro1.102 It 
may also have contributed to the failure to collea reliable data on accidents. 103 
6. Accident Prevention. Although not included among the five guiding princi-
ples of Compo, promotion of safety is made a matter of "prime importance" in 
the Accident Compensation ActIO. as well as in the report of the Royal Com-
mission, the Woodhouse Report,IOO which led to the Aa's adoption in the first 
place. Indeed, as between prevention, rehabilitation, and compensation, the 
Woodhouse Report stated that prevention was "[c]he most important"106 and 
that "(a)ny modern compensation scheme must have a branch concerned solely 
with safety. Effective education, adequate inspeaion, and firm enforcement 
96 See id. paras. 124, 170-171, 399-404. 
97 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
98 Accident Compensation Aer, 1982, § 60(5). 
99 WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, para. 55 (emphasis added). 
100 See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, paras. 188-194. 
101 WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, para. 62. 
102 See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 179 (recognizing that maintaining 
a the distinClion between injury and illness was "one incentive for abuse"). 
103 See infra text accompanying notes 233-34. 
10. Accident Compensation ACl, 1982, § 35. 
105 WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, para. 2. 
108 [d. 
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must all be backed up by the allocation of funds and the stimulus of central 
direction."107 The role of the ACC in promoting safety is therefore explicitly 
provided for in the Act. 108 Unfortunately, the ACC has not succeeded in fulfil-
ling its role as a promoter of safety. lOB 
C. The Goals and Policies 0/ the Tort Liability System 
The goals and policies of the common law system for dealing with personal 
injury accidents have, until recently, 11 0 rarely been dearly articulated or agreed-
upon by the common law judges who participated in the creation and evolution 
of the system. Instead, such goals and policies have more often been discovered 
after the fact by scholars11l and great judges11l1 who have reviewed the past in a 
search for likely rationales. By now, however, many policies which the tort sys-
tem actually serve or ought to serve have been identified and debated. u3 
10'1 ld. para. 3. 
108 The ACC Compensation Act states that, "(i}t shall be a matter of prime importance for 
the Corporation to take an active and co-ordinating role in the promotion of safety in all the 
different areas where accidents can occur in New Zealand." Accident Compensation Act, 1982, S 
35(1). Additionally, subsection 4 provides: 
The functions of the Corporation in relation to the promotion of safety shall include--
(a) Stimulating and maintaining interest in safety and the prevention of personal injuty by 
accident: 
(b) Publishing and disseminating safety literature and information: 
(c) Sponsoring, assisting, and conducting safety campaigns, exhibitions, and courses: 
(d) Sponsoring, supporting, and fostering organisations and groups concerned with safety 
and the prevention of personal injuty by accident: 
(e) Researching into causes, incidence, costs, and merhods of prevention of petsonal injuty 
by accident: 
(f) Derermining the requirements in respect of, and providing or arranging for provision to 
be made for, the adequate recording of statistical information concerning personal injuty 
by accident: 
(g) Seeking continuously for new ways to reduce the number and severity of accidents and 
personal injuries in all fields. 
ld. § 35 (4). 
Section 40 of the Act provides for safety incentives by way of bonuses and penalties on levies 
payable by employers and self-employed persons. 
1011 See inf,.a text accompanying notes 188-246. Other goals and sub-goals of the scheme will 
be mentioned in the text where relevant. 
110 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurting). 
111 See, t.g., W. KEEToN. D. DOBBS. R. KEEToN & D. OWEN. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAw OF TORTS. ch. I (5th ed. 1984). 
us See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES. THE CoMMON LAw 77-110 (1881). 
118 Most of these have been discussed in THE SPECIAL CoMMITIEE ON THE TORT lIABlUTY 
SYSTEM. TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CoNTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF 
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In this anicle the focus is mainly upon the policies of accident prevention 
and deterrence, since these are the objectives I assert are seriously overlooked in 
New Zealand under Compo. It is of course widely understood that accidents 
and their costs cannot be eliminated without interfering unreasonably with the 
beneficial aspects of society. Instead, the appropriate goal is to optimize accident 
costs-to achieve the most "efficient" level of accident costs. I .. Tort law argua-
bly achieves prevention either by direct or general deterrence. Under direct or 
specific deterrence, the fe~ of sanctions-large tort damage awards, increases in 
the price of liability insurance, or both-lead actors to make cost-efficient deci-
sions conducive to safety. Under general deterrence placing the costs of ineffi-
cient accidents on the activities that caused them will cause the price of those 
activities to rise to reflect their accident costs. The consequence is (or is believed 
to be) that in a free market, the rate of consumption of activities will be signifi-
cantly effected by price, with the consumption of unsafe activities reduced in 
relation to the consumption of safer activities. Conversely, removing the acci-
dent costs from the price of an activity-"extemalizing" accident costs-will 
bring about an inefficiently high level of panicipation in that activity.lll1 
Another form of deterrence, other than through economic incentives, has 
been well described by Professor Nesson: "Society attempts, through the judg-
ments of its courts, to project a behavioral message that will influence individ-
ual's conduct."1l6 This influence operates not only by bringing home to the 
actor the consequences of his conduct but, more importantly, by sending 
messages about what conduct the law disapproves the law "serves a moralizing, 
educative function . . . ." which results in an assimilation of preferred behav-
ioral norms.1l7 
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAw-REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION 4-1 
to -157 (1984). They include reduction of the occurrence and severity, of injuty-causing events; 
optimizing of the level of risky activity; protecting entidements; compensation; responsiveness to 
the dynamic nature of an increasingly technological society; dealing with disputes arising out of a 
system of mass production and distribution; spreading of risk and of loss; a response to the ability 
of actors to control the activities and lives of others; providing relatively clear standards of con-
duct; serving justice, fairness, and morality; and punishment and retribution. Id. 
114 G. CAlABRESI. THE COSTS OF AcaoENTS (1970). With respect to the New Zealand 
scheme, Calabresi's thesis is discussed in G. PALMER, AcaOENT CoMPENSATION, supra note 3, at 
362-63, 366, and Palmer, Dangerous Produm and the Consumer in New Zealand, 1975 N.Z.L.}. 
366, 375-77. See also Swan, The Economics of Law: Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No-
Fault Insurance, Occupational Licensing and Criminology?, Ausn. ECON. REV., 3rd Qtr., 1984, at 
92-
110 See sources cited supra note 114. See also R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw §§ 4.2-
4.15 (1973). 
118 Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985). 
111 Id. at 1359-60. See also Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, 37 PRoc. ACAD. POL Sei. 
18, 29 (1988) ("{I]n addition to irs direct provision of compensation {the torr system} supports a 
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Since Compo has largely externalized accident costsl18 and currently proposed 
legislation purports to move to even greater externalization, l19 the issue of de-
terrence seems to be the most immediate and relevant policy issue to discuss in 
appraising differences between the two systems. Only if it appears that there is 
no significant difference in deterrence or accident prevention outcomes under the 
two systems would it become worthwhile to evaluate the worthiness of the other 
policies of tort law. 
Of course, if the systems are to be compared on the basis of accident preven-
tion and deterrence, the costs of accidents must not be ignored. If as a result of 
Compo's deletion of tort liability the rate and severity of accidents have in-
creased over what they othetwise would have been, then the increased costs of 
accidents should either be charged to Compo or subtracted from the costs of the 
tort liability system. no 
Perhaps there is another facet of tort law which though seldom identified as a 
policy of the law is nevertheless an important feature of it, particularly with 
regard to the issues discussed here. The system of tort law is self-invoking and 
application of safety norms is largely effected through private negotiations in which 
the coercive elements of governmental power serve mainly as an incentive to private 
resolution. Victims under the system are given a strong motivation to have their 
accidents evaluated and, if determined by a lawyer probably to have been 
caused by a tort, to proceed with their claims. 121 Thus, individuals and entities, 
vast system of bargaining in which almost all disputes are resolved by negotiation and . . . 
stimulates a host of preventive activities by threatening and educating those engaged in the vari-
ous activities that underlie injuries and disputes. "). But cf Sugarman, supra note 9, at 611-13 
(assening that arguments for the moralizing or educating function of ton law are unconvincing). 
As to the beneficial deterrent effect of ton law in the health care context, See Bennett, The 
Advantage of Malpractice SuilJ, TRIAL, Sept. 1988, at 20, (reprinted from the N.Y. TIMES MAGA-
ZINE, July 24, 1988) ("[1]he malpractice system almost cenainly costs less, by deterring negligent 
care, than it saves." [d. at 72, col. 3) (Bennett is the editor of the Harvard Medical School Health 
Letter); Halberstam, The DoctDr's New Dilemma-"Will [ Be Sued?", N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
Feb. 14, 1971, at 8, ("The abuses of the present system [of ton liability) are great, but on the 
whole it probably has done more good than harm, for coun action remains one of the few ways 
of enforcing discipline and improving the standards of careless doctors."). 
118 See infra text accompanying notes 182-84. 
119 See infra text accompanying notes 311-50. 
110 See R. POSNER, supra note 115. As noted by Richard Posner: 
If compensation is the only purpose of the negligence system, it is a poor system, being 
both costiy and incomplete. Its economic function, however, is not compensation, but 
deterrence of noncost-justified accidents. If the system yields substantial savings in accident 
COStS, the heavy administrative COStS of the system, which relate primarily to the determi-
nation of liability-the determination whether the accident was uneconomical-may well 
be justified. 
[d. at 84. 
111 See Galanter, supra note 117. 
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through their self-interest-rather than an army of paid regulators and inspec-
tors-act to achieve the deterrence goals of tort law.122 In comparing Compo 
with tort law, therefore, the relative costS of enforcement also need to be in-
cluded in the calculus. If a reduction in accidents under a pure no-fault system 
like Compo can only be achieved by establishing comprehensive regulatory and 
administrative structures, then the costs of these strucrures should be charged to 
Compo in determining the relative costs of the two systems. 12S 
Since it is my view that the abolition of the personal injury action has led to 
a serious failure of accident prevention, it is appropriate now to examine the 
"crisis" of 1986-87 and its causes. 
III. THE "CRISIS" AND ITS CAUSES 
A. Increases in Levies 
On December 19, 1986 an Order in Councip24 which rivalled Scrooge in its 
meanness announced very substantial increases in the levies employers would 
have to pay to the ACC for the forthcoming year to fund the earners ac-
count.121i Individual increases, according to the class of industrial activity into 
which the employer fell, ranged from 120 percent to 537 percent. For employ-
ers, the average increase was 192 percent; for the self-employed, 265 percent.126 
In addition, the government added an additional eight cents per hundred dol-
lars of payroll in order to fund the Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare Pro-
The motivation would seem to be much greater in a jurisdiction where the contingent fee 
system is permitted and widely used and where the winning party's attorney's fees are not rou-
tinely charged to the loser, like the United States, than in one in which neither is the case, like 
New Zealand and Great Britain. Indeed, as has already been suggested, Jee Jupra note 10, the 
absence of these fearures in New Zealand may be the reason why doing away with the ton 
system may not have had any profound effect on the rate of accidents there. 
122 Less calculable from an economic standpoint, but perhaps equally imponant from the 
viewpoint of human dignity, is, first, the likely increase in bribery as a device for avoiding detec-
tion if the principle mode of accident prevention becomes one of administrative inspection and 
regulation. Second, even more threatening are the potential problems of civil libenies which may 
arise if accident prevention outside of the arena of industrial safery is achieved by use of inspec-
tors or public interest groups who must necessarily intrude into areas, such as rented homes and 
public areas of private businesses, where potential safery problems may arise in order to gather 
information for invoking regulatory prescriptions. 
123 Of course, the converse is also true: Since the ton system only compensates ton victims, 
and even then only to the extent that their tonfeasors are insured or are able to pay, the cost of 
more complete compensation must be considered before a fair comparison can be made with 
Compo. 
12. Order in Council, 1986/380 (Dec. 19, 1986). 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 69-76. 
126 1987 ACC ANNUAL REPORT, Jupra note 69, at 9. 
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gramme of the Depanment of Labour.127 The new levies ran from a low of 
$1.20 per $100 of payroll to $27.85. These increases in the levies for the earn-
ers account followed on the heels of a new rate, announced in July 1, 1986, for 
the motor vehicle account-$43.1O per vehicle-which was roughly twice the 
rate for the prior year. 128 
As a result of these increases employers and employer groups complained 
vociferously and organized to resist paying the new and higher levies.129 In 
response, labor leaders threatened retaliation with "industrial action"lSo if em-
117 Id. To make matters worse, all levies are subject to a ten percent Goods and Services Tax 
(GST). GUIDE TO ACC LEVY STRUCTURE. supra note 72, at 12. 
12S Order in Council, 1986/93 (May 19, 1986). If Compo were available in the United States 
this levy would in effect substitute for the need to purchase liability insurance for bodily injuty, 
personal injuty protection in a system which has adopted no-fault, medical payments coverage, 
and uninsured motorist coverage. It would not eliminate the need for propercy damage liability, 
collision insurance, and comprehensive coverage. 
The motor vehicle levy more than doubled again in November, 1987, rising to $100 per 
motor vehicle. UNINTENTIONAL INJURY. supra note 21, at 24-25. This compares with the author's 
six month automobile insurance premium to Govemment Employers Insurance Company of 
$249.40 for Bodily Injuty Liability ($300,000 limits), $70.60 for Basic Personal Injuty Protec-
tion of $15,000 (no-fault), and $14 for Uninsured Motorist Coverage, for a total of U.S.$668 for 
the year commencing December 6, 1988, more than one year after the quoted levy. 
12e Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), June 13, 1987, at 6, col. 5 (letter from small business 
owner complaining of 300 per cent increase in levies); id. June 4, 1987, at 7, col. 4 ("Compo 
hailed as model for world"; article says ACC will start legal proceedings against employers who 
refuse to pay levies; mentions meat industty association as one of the groups of employers threat-
ening to boycott the levy increase); id. June 2, 1987, at 2, col. 7 ("Compo 'cheapest in world'; 
article discusses response of officer of ACC who is also national secretary of the Harbour Workers 
Union to plans of some employers to boycott the payment of levies); id. May 28, 1987, at I, col. 
1 ("Levy boycott predicted"); id. May 26, 1987, at 10, col. 1 (Editorial: "Breaking the Law"; 
comments on the proposed defiance of the Meat Industty Association to pay higher levies); id. 
May 22, 1987; McCulloch, Levy stand risks comprr-Rodger, id. at 3, col. 7 (repon of assenion by 
government minister in charge of Compo that payments of accident compensation may be at risk 
if other employers follow the lead of the meat industty in refusing to pay increases in levies); id. 
May 20, 1987, at 8, col. 1 (repon that president of the Institute of Directors "has expressed 
concern that many businesses may not be able to alford an increase in ... levies."); id. May 12, 
1987, at 2, col. 4 ("The Manufacturers Federation has called for an urgent overhaul of the 
[ACC),,); Otago Daily Times, Mar. 25, 1987, at 16, col. 7 (repons comments by member of 
parliament to the effect that employers' complaints about large increases in levies are justified); 
Keenan, Shearing levy rise opposed, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), Mar. 13, 1987, at 16, col. 4 
(repons that sheep shearing contractors will refuse to pay increases in ACC levies which were 
announced in December, 1986). 
130 Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), May 30, 1987, at 3, col. 2 ("Four days left for employers 
to pay levy"; repons: "The Federation of Labour has already told employers that any attempt to 
sabotage the accident compensation system would be met with an industrial response."); Managh, 
Warning by FOL on Compo Sabotage, id. May 27, 1987, at 3, col. 1 ("The Federation of Labour 
told employers yesterday any attempts to sabotage the accident compensation system would be 
met with industrial muscle."); McCulloch, Unions criticise boycotl 0/ levy, id. May 26, 1987, at 7, 
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ployers failed to pay the new levies. Labor was concerned because an employers' 
boycott could produce an inability on the part of the ACC to pay compensation 
to accident victims;131 the ACe's reserve funds had been exhaustedl32 and it 
had no clear rightl8S or ability to borrow the funds that might be necessary. 
Viewed in comparison to costs in other countries, however, the new rates 
were not terribly high. Levies for the earners account are paid in lieu of both 
workers' compensation and liability insurance for personal injury. If the rates 
were to be averaged for all industrial activities,134 the average cost would have 
been only about $3.00 per $100 of payroll. This, as the Law Commission has 
noted, was not far out of line with workers' compensation premiums 
elsewhere. lslI 
What upset the New Zealand employers, however, were the sudden and 
unexpected increases in the December, 1986 levies. As we have discovered in 
the United States, the best way to incur the wrath of insureds is to impose huge 
and unexpected increases in premiums.18G. That is what happened in New Zea-
land. The big difference there, however, was that unhappy levy payers could not 
blame the increases on lawyers and the ton system. Instead, they blamed it 
mainly on cheating by employees and on the fact that their levies were "un-
fairly" supponing off-work accidents, such as those incurred in the punishing 
game of rugby, as well as work-related accidents. ls7 
col. 1. 
181 McCulloch, Levy stand risks compo-Rodger, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), May 22, 
1987, at 3, col. 7 (reports Stan Rodger, the minister responsible for Compo, as saying "there was 
no golden pool of money and if employers generally took the [Meat Industry) association's ap-
proach, [refusing to pay levy increases,) compensation payments were at risk. "). 
131 195 million loan to stay afloat, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), May 27, 1987, at 3, col. 1 
(reports comments of ACC finance general manager that the ACC had borrowed $95 million to 
meet day-to-day expenditures and that its financial reserves were near zero). 
183 See Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 9(6) (ACC can only borrow money and mortgage 
its property with the prior consent of the Minister of Finance.). 
134 Averaging is what is recommended in SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, paras. 
250-266. 
136 Id. para. 248. Comparisons were drawn with rates in four Australian states. 
138 Cf The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544, 544 (1986) ("The current liabiliry-
insurance crisis began . . . with skyrocketing premiums and cancellations of policies. "). 
137 Compo scheme attacked, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), May 12, 1987, at 2, col. 4 (Re-
ports that the Manufacturers Federation urged that "embarrassing and burdensome" lump sum 
payments be scrapped; that beneficiaries be made to pay minimum costS before making claims on 
Compo; that the COSt of non-work accidents be spread "more evenly" through the communiry; 
and cost controls should be made more effective "by rigid criteria and minimum claim levels."); 
Hellaby, Freezing workers 'abusing compo', id. Mar. 6, 1987, at 1, col. 2. 
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B. Articulated Causes 0/ Increases 
The immediate causes of the December, 1986 increases in levies were gener-
ally agreed to be a change in the method of funding Compo coupled with 
increases in its costs. 
1. Changes in Funding Methods 
Initially, Compo was intended to be fully funded by current levies. That is, 
each year levies were imposed sufficient to fund the benefits for all accidents 
arising the prior year for so long as the benefits had to be paid. Thus, for 
example, if a thirty-year old employee earning $2,000 per month were perma-
nently and totally incapacitated in 1986, sufficient levies would have to be im-
posed on the next levy date to raise funds sufficient, when invested, to cover all 
Compo benefits-including $1,600 per month (80 percent of his earnings) plus 
periodic cost of living increases-for that employee until retirement. Such fund-
ing necessarily involved complex actuarial predictions. It also produced enor-
mous reserves which were invested in order to produce the growth necessary to 
pay benefits each year as they became payable to prior years' victims. 
In 1982 the system of funding was changed from full funding to current-cost 
financing, called-perhaps deceptively-"pay as you go,"138 Under current-cost 
financing only enough income need be produced each year to cover actual 
Compo costs for the following year with reserves sufficient to pay several extra 
months' expenditure.139 While the reasons for the change may have been 
sound-reducing the costs and perhaps the unreliability of long-range actuarial 
predictions of the full cost of current accidents 14°-the manner in which the 
change was undertaken, plus substantial increases in Compo's costS, created a 
crisis of solvency and a consequent need for sharp increases in levies. Evidently, 
the 1982 decision to change to current-cost financing was accompanied by a 
parallel decision to use up the then large reserve produced by the fully-funded 
system by keeping levies very low or reducing them. 141 Unfortunately, heavy 
increases in the costs of Compo rapidly diminished the huge reserves and 
threatened to exhaust the system's funds. The response of the ACC was the 
138 1987 ACC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 10, 11; UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 
21, at 26. 
139 The ACC has determined that reserves equivalent to seven months expenditures are appro-
priate. GUIDE TO ACC LEVY STRUCTURE, supra note 72, at 9. 
140 See Address by Professor T.G. Ison, Accident Compensation in New ZeaJand-Future 
Options, Nov. 28, 1985, at 21, 22 (available in Faculty of Law Library, Victoria University of 
Wellington) {hereinafter Future Options]. 
Ul Cf 1987 ACC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 4. 
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Order in Council of December, 1986 that triggered the outcry. 142 
2. Increases in CoslS 
If it is assumed, as Professor Ison had suggested,143 that the move from a 
fully-funded to a current-cost financed system was justified, then allowing the 
existing reserves-paid for by past levies-to run down and keeping levies ani-
ficially low until the reserves were exhausted, thus precipitating the need for a 
sharp increases, might have constituted poor strategy and bad politics but did 
not necessarily reflect a serious problem with Compo itself. However, the swift-
ness with which the reserves were used up suggested that Compo's costs were 
increasing at an alarming rate. 
That there was a serious problem of escalating costs was the perception which 
led in early 1986 to the convening of a committee of officials by three govern-
ment ministers144 to conduct a review of the accident compensation scheme. 
According to the officials who drafted the report, "[t}his panicular review was 
prompted by inequities in treatment of illness and accident disabled and con-
cern about escalating costs of the present accident compensation scheme."14~ 
In August, 1986 the Officials Committee submitted a lengthy report which 
warned: 
{nhe financial viability of the current scheme is open to question given the mas-
sive cost blow-out in compensation which has occurred. This has caused a much 
more rapid run-down of reserves than was originally forecast. To maintain the 
142 The ACC claims: 
[I}f the pan of the scheme funded by levies on employers had been on a pay-as-you-go 
basis with adequate reserves, the average rate of levy over recent years would have been as 
follows: 
Average Employer Levy per $100 of Payroll 
Year Pay-as Actual 
-you-go 
1984/85 0.97 0.74 
1985/86 1.17 0.74 
1986/87 1.54 0.77 
1987/88 1.69· 2.25 
·estimated 
[d. at 11. 
148 Future Options, supra note 140, at 21, 22. 
, .. Deputy Prime Minister G.W.R. Palmer, the Minister of Labour S.}. Rodger, and the 
Associate Minister of Finance D. Caygill. Geoffrey Palmer, the Deputy Prime Minister and now 
Minister of Justice, is a former law professor who has taught in the United States; he was in-
volved in research which led to the adoption of Compo. See G. PALMER, ACCIDENT COMPENSA-
TION, supra note 3, at 112. 
146 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIAlS CoMMI1TEE, supra note 85, at 1. 
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current scheme at current levels will require substantial increases in levies each 
year .... The Committee is firmly of the opinion that the scheme cannot con-
tinue in its present form. a8 
The evidence of a "massive cost blow-out" was taken from the ACC's finan-
cial statements for the year ended March 31, 1986.147 The data in these state-
ments, illustrated in tables 1 through 5,148 paint a dramatic piaure of a system 
whose costs seem to have gone out of control. They show continuing large per-
centage increases each year since 1981 in compensation paid by ACC both for 
accidents occurring in prior years and for accidents occurring in the reponing 
year. 
Table 1 
COMPENSATION PAID BY YEAR IN MILLIONS 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN 
COMPENSATION PAID149 
Total compenJation (all accountJ): 
Prior Years' Oaim 
1988 Not Available 
1987 Not Available 
1986 $186 - 17.7% 
1985 $158 - 29.6% 
19845131 - 18.0% 
1983 $111 - 32.0% 
1982 $ 84 - not avail. 
Avg. % incr. - 24.3% 
14e ld. at 3. 
Urrtlll Year's Oaims 
Not Available 
Not Available 
$230 - 49.4% 
$154 - 20.3% 
$128 - 10.3% 
$116 - 39.8% 
$ 83 - not avail. 
30.1% 
AlIOaims 
$620 - 17% 
$531 - 28% 
$416 - 34% 
$312 - 20% 
$259 - 14% 
$227 - 36% 
$167 - 32% 
25.9% 
14? ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CoRPORATION, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 
MARCH 1986 (1986) {hereinafter 1986 FINANOAL STATEMENTS}. 
14e See infra, pp. 47-51. 
14' 1986 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 147, at 3; ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORA-
TION, ANNUAL REVIEW 33 (1988) {hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL REVIEW, The author requested 
financial statements for years after 1986 from ACC and received the 1988 ANNUAL REVIEW. 
Although that (very attractive and glossy) pamphlet contained financial statements, it did not 
categorize compensation payments by account nor separately report the costs of current year's 
accidents and past years' accidents in the manner of the document which contained financial 
statements for the year ended March 31, 1986. Cf 1986 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 1upra note 147. 
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Table 2 
COMPENSATION PAID BY YEAR IN MILLIONS 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN COMPENSATION PAIDuo 
Earners Account: 
Prior Years' Claim 
1986 $120 - 23.7% 
1985 $ 97 - 18.3% 
1984 S 82 - 5.1% 
1983 $ 78 - 34.4% 
1982 $ 58 - not avail. 
Avg. % incr. - 20.4% 
Currtnl Year's Claims 
Table 3 
$\50 - 45.7% 
$105 - 23.5% 
$ 85 - 2.4% 
$ 83 - 38.3% 
$ 60 - not avail. 
27.5% 
All Claims 
$273 - 36% 
$202 - 21% 
$167 - 4% 
$161 - 36% 
$1\8 - 30% 
25.4% 
COMPENSATION PAID BY YEAR IN MILLIONS 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN COMPENSATION PAIDlr>1 
Motor Vehicle Account: 
Prior Years' Claim 
1986 $ 50 - 4.2% 
1985 S 48 - 20.0% 
1984 $ 40 - 66.7% 
1983 $ 24 - 26.3% 
1982 $ 19 - not avail. 
Avg. % incr. - 29.3% 
Currtnl Year's Claims 
Table 4 
$ 37 - 68.2% 
$ 22 - 15.8% 
$ 19 - 58.3% 
$ 12 - 33.3% 
$ 9 - not avail. 
43.9% 
All Claims 
$ 87 - 25% 
$ 70 - 19% 
$ 58 - 64% 
$36-29% 
$ 28 - 33% 
34% 
COMPENSATION PAID BY YEAR IN MILLIONS 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN COMPENSATION PAIDU2 
Supplementary Account: 
Prior Years' Claim 
1986 $ 15 - 15.4% 
1985 $ 13 - 44.4% 
1984 $ 9 - 0.0% 
CU~nI Year's Claims 
$ 40 - 48.1% 
$27-11.1% 
$ 24 - 14.3% 
1&0 1986 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 147, at 3. 
mId. 
162 1986 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. supra note 147, at 3. 
All Claims 
$ 55 - 38% 
$40-21% 
$ 33 - 10% 
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1983 $ 9 - 28.6% 
1982 $ 7 - not avail. 
Avg. % incr. - 22.1% 
$ 21 - 50.0% 
$ 14 - not avail. 
30.9% 
C. Possible Causes of the Annual Increases in Costs 
$ 30 - 43% 
$ 21 - 40% 
34.4% 
As Table 5 indicates, the annual increases in costs generally exceed by signifi-
cant degree the increases in inflation rates in New Zealand for the reported 
years. lOS 
Table 5 
REAL COMPENSATION PAID AND ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
INCREASES IN REAL COMPENSATION 
IN 1981 DOLLARS (in millionsJiM 
Prior Year!' Claim Cllrrrm Year's Claims AJJ Claims 
1987 $153 - 14.2% $106 - 00.0% $259 - 7.9% 
1986 $134 - 24.1% $106 - 11.6% $240 - 18.2% 
1985 $108 - 11.3% S 95 - 00.0% $203 - 5.7% 
1984 $ 97 - 14.1% $ 95 - 6.7% $192 - 10.3% 
1983 $ 85 - 16.4% $ 89 - 23.6% $174 - 20.0% 
1982 $ 73 - 23.7% $ 72 - 5.9% $ 145 - 14.2% 
1981 S 59 - not avail. $ 68 - not avail. $ 127 - n.a. 
Avg. Increase: 17.3% 8.0% 12.7% 
% Increase from 
1981 to 1987: 159.3% 55.9% 103.9% 
Arguably, real increases of the dimension there reported cannot continually be 
sustained, regardless of the source of funding, in a small nation suffering New 
Zealand's economic problems. loo 
The annual increase in real costs, which has been labeled "cost creep," is 
expeaed by the ACC to account for about 12.8 percent of the added expendi-
ture for 1989 over 1988.108 The ACC and others who support Compo have 
l~a See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT supra note 30, para. 85 ("Over the 4 year period from 
1978 co 1982 the expenditure remained fairly constant when inAation is taken into account. But 
the next 4 years saw a real increase of 49% or about 12% per year, and 40% over just the past 3 
years with almost half of that occurring between 1985 and 1986. The rate of increase between 
1987 and 1988 is 10%."). See also GUIDE TO ACC LEVY STRUCTURE. supra note 72, at 10; 1988 
ANNUAL REVIEW. supra note 149, at 28. 
1M SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30. para. 87. 
1~~ See infra note 353. 
1116 1988 ANNUAL REVIEW. supra note 149, at 28 ("A disturbing feature is the excess of 
expenditure over the normally expected rate of inAation."). 
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been hard-pressed to find a full explanation for cost creep. Possible causes which 
have been identified by ACC include increases in the public's awareness of the 
availability of payments for noneconomic loss and increases in the size of the 
payments being made; increasing health care costs paid for by the ACC rather 
than the public health system, including greater use of private hospital treat-
ment; "hidden unemployment," wherein workers who are partially disabled 
and receiving Compo payments and who (by virtue of New Zealand's poor 
economic climate) cannot find suitable alternative work continue to receive full 
weekly ERC; and increasing abuse of Compo, both as to possibly fraudulent 
claims and the payment of excessive and unnecessary medical claims. l&7 
Although conceding that "[m}ajor questions about costs still remain,"1&8 the 
Law Commission's recent report mentioned other possible causes of cost creep. 
Increases in the compensation paid to those who claimed compensation in ear-
lier years, it noted, were a necessary result of the maturing of the scheme: each 
year it is necessary to continue to pay both ERC and medical benefits for vic-
tims injured in prior years, some of whom will continue to receive Compo until 
retirement. The build up of the numbers of persons receiving compensation was 
expected to take up to twenty years, with the largest annual increases occurring 
during the first twelve years or SO.1&9 According to the Commission: "Exactly 
that is happening. "180 
The Commission, however, did express concern about the possibility that 
some victims are being paid compensation for too long a period.16l It also 
pointed to a change in the Act that allowed injured workers fit for light duties 
to continue to receive ERC without reduction for the amounts they were capa-
ble of earning if they could not find such work. 162 
Very substantial annual increases in lump sums for noneconomic loss were 
attributed by the Law Commission to higher awards allowed under the Act163 
107 GUIDE TO ACC LEVY STRUClURE, lupra note 72, at 10. 
10. SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, lupra note 30, para. 100. 
1.9 Id. para. 89. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. paras. 90, 93. 
{O]ne survey of a district comparing 1984 and 1987 suggests a near doubling of the 
proportion of persons receiving earnings related compensation for 44 weeks (from 3.3% to 
6. I %); and other calculations and projections suggest an increase in the average number of 
days on earnings related compensation from 23.9 in 1982/83 ro 32.1 in 1986/87. The 
process of making medical assessment may be a significant facror. 
Id. para. 93. 
182 Id. para. 94. 
183 Id. paras. 95, 96. Effective in 1983 the maximum amount for permanent loss or impair-
ment of bodily function was increased by $10,000, to $17,000. Accident Compensation Act, 
1982, § 78. 
30 University 0/ Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 11: 1 
and in some cases mandated by judicial decision,184 an increase in the number 
of claims,1811 and the clearing up of a backlog of claims.188 
Increases in medical payments for private hospital costs were attributed to 
"an increase in the volume of the services so provided,"187 perhaps reflecting a 
preference by physicians and their patients for private accommodations over 
those provided by the public sector. 18S The Commission hinted that other in-
creases in medical payments might be the result of overutilization in situations 
where the victim is not personally surcharged for use of the service, as in the 
case of medical specialists. 189 
The important question remained unanswered, however. Were increases in 
costs attributable to any extent to increases in accidents or their severity? 
In my 1987 submission to the Law Commission I suggested that a failure of 
deterrence might constitute a significant factor in the "massive cost blow-out" 
identified by the Officials Committee. l7O The Law Commission's final report, 
entitled "Personal Injuty: Prevention and Recovery,"171 however, did not di-
rectly confront that possibility. Instead, the report first cited the conclusions of 
Professor Brown's article to the effect that the removal of tort liability for per-
sonal injury has not been shown to have an adverse effect on automobile acci-
dent rates. 172 After conceding that comparable statistics for other unintentional 
injuries are unavailable,173 it then cited an OECD report of annual day's work 
lost due to ill health and rates of fatal injuries in industry174 which, though 
evidently seriously underreporting the numbers of injuries,1711 nevertheless indi-
cated no significant changes in the annual average of lost workdays in New 
Zealand between 1973 and 1983 and only small changes in the rates of fatal 
184 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra nme 3D, para. 96. See, e.g., In re Appleby, 5 
N.Z.L.R. 99 (1985); Jones v. Accident Compensation Comm'n, 2 N.Z.L.R. 379 (1980) (lump 
sum awards for loss of amenities of life, for pain and suffering, and for disfigurement should not 
be scaled as a percentage of the COtal amount allowed (which has not increased with inflation) but 
awards should be based on the amount the coun thinks is deserving and, if that amount exceeds 
the maximum, the maximum should be granted). 
166 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 3D, para. 95. 
le8 Id. 
187 Id. para. 98. 
18a C/ Jupra note 33 and accompanying text. 
18e As compared with using general practitioners, where the claimant was required co pay for a 
pan of the service. SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30, para. 97. 
170 See Jupra text accompanying note 146. 
171 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30 (emphasis in tide added) . 
... Bcown, Jupra note 3. 
173 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30, para. 80 . 
.. 4 Id. (citing OECD, MEASURING HEALTH CARE 1960-1983, EXPENDITURE, COSTS AND PER· 
FORMANCE tables F.3, F.5(b) (1985». 
176 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 3D, para. 80. 
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injuries among workers there during the last twenty years. 176 On this flimsy 
evidence the Commission then offered its opinion that it did not "see the al-
leged deterrent role of rort liability for such injuries as a significant factor. "177 
Moreover, after examining the costs data, the Commission expressed doubt 
that there had. been a "massive cost blow-out," stating that to so suggest was, 
in its opinion, misleading.178 Instead, the report noted that Compo was rela-
tively inexpensive, amounting in 1987-88 to only 1.2 percent of gross domestic 
product while furnishing twenty-four hour protection at a cost of only sixty 
cents per person for protection .from every kind of accident.179 
Finally, the Commission's report made much of the fact that most of the 
annual increases, in real dollars, are attributable to continuing claims made for 
accidents which occurred in prior years. "There is very little real change in the 
amounts paid in each year for new claims-as there would be if the cost blow-
out description were justified."180 
It would appear, however, that the Law Commission did not really face up to 
the implications of the cited data. In the first place, the annual real increases in 
compensation for new accidents seem far from inconsequential. An average in-
crease, after inflation, of eight percent per year, or an increase of almost fifty-six 
percent over a six year period-occurring more than ten years after the system 
was begun-cannot be attributed just to greater awareness of the existence of 
the system. Something else is obviously afoot and whatever it is-whether 
abuse of the system, an increase in accidents or their severity, or a combination 
of these-should not be so lightly dismissed. That an increase in real compensa-
tion for new accidents did not occur in two years of the six may be puzzling, 
but it emphasizes the size of the increases in the other four years. And certainly 
a more than doubling of the real costs of the entire system over a six year 
period qualifies for the epithet "massive cost blow-out." 
Further, it is by no means clear that increases in the cost of compensation for 
prior years' accidents do not reflect a worsening accident experience. As the 
Commission itself notes, part of the increasing costs of prior years' accidents is 
attributable to "large increases in the numbers of people who are still receiving 
payments after three years."181 Such increases may, of course, be attributable to 
116 ld. 
117 ld. para. 81. 
178 ld. para. 16. 
179 ld. The report also noted that the New Zealand system accounts for a lower percentage of 
New Zealand's gross domestic product (1.2%) than the cOStS of the less comprehensive combina-
tion of third party motor vehicle insurance plus employer's liability insurance account for in 
relation to Australia's gross domestic product (1.7%). ld. 
180 ld. paras. 16, 87. 
181 ld. para. 90. The Report also noted a "relative increase in recent years of motor vehicle 
injuries (with their higher average cost)" but expressed doubt as to what weight to give to that 
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malingering (possibly produced by a shortage of jobs), but the more plausible 
cause is an increase in the seriousness of injuries, requiring a greater average 
period for recuperation and rehabilitation. 
Compensation for prior years' accidents may also reflect increases in accidents 
or their severity if Compo payments for seriously injured persons are signifi-
cantly delayed before regular payments are made or if they occur toward the 
end of the reporting year. Assume, for example, that an accident causing per-
manent and total incapacity occurs two months before the end of the ACC's 
reporting year and that payment of ERC, in the amount of $3,000 per month, 
does not begin until the beginning of the last month of the period. In such 
case, the statistics for the year of the accident would reflect, at most, payment 
for two months ($6,000) but the next year would include, under compensation 
paid for accidents in earlier years, a full year's compensation-$36,000. 
Moreover, although Compo purpons to be a comprehensive accident com-
pensation system, its allegedly low costs do not fully reflect New Zealand's acci-
dents. For persons who are killed outright but who leave no dependents nothing 
but funeral expenses are paid. Housewives and the elderly and visitors to New 
Zealand who are injured receive no ERC and children may never receive what 
their potential earning capacity might have provided had they not been injured. 
Earners whose incomes exceed the leviable amounts receive no ERC to compen-
sate for lost earnings in excess of those amounts, and ACC pays no ERC for the 
first week of accidents. Further, a significant degree of externalization of acci-
dent costs occurs in the area of medical expenses, since a significant amount of 
medical treatment for accidents is provided through the social security system 
and not charged to the accident scheme at all. 182 Indeed, the Law Commission 
itself estimated that accident costs equal to about half the amount paid by ACC 
are not borne by the accident compensation scheme. 183 Its estimate of externalized 
costs, however, only included some of the earnings losses borne by employers 
and employees184 and medical- costs paid out of Health Vote, such as accident 
care in public hospitals, but not medical care privately paid for. Furthermore, 
the estimate does not include uncompensated losses of earning capacity of in-
information. ld. This information could cast doubt on Professor Brown's findings that the advent 
of Compo has not produced an increase in automobile accidents. Cj Brown, supra note 3, at 984-
94. Professor Brown's figures ran only through 1980. 
18' Many New Zealanders carry private first parry hospital and medical insurance because of 
the perceived inadequacies of the medical care provided through the Social Security System. It is 
not known to what extent such private insurance is used to cover the medical COSts of accidents 
without any insurer's subrogation rights being exercised. 
183 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 226. See also 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS 
COMMITTEE, supra note 85, at 83 (cited by the Law Commission). 
184 Included were the first week of compensation and twenry percent of earners' salaries not 
paid as ERC; excluded was the amount of earnings of earners in excess of the maximum leviable 
amount. 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMITTEE, supra note 85, at 83. 
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jured non-earners and injured visitors. 
The relevance of the degree of externalization just described is this: If Compo 
were comprehensive in covering all accident costs, then the' costs of the system 
would truly reflect the costs of New Zealand accidents including the rate of 
increases in accidents and in their severity. If that were the case, a per capita 
cost of sixty cents per person per day for all accidents would arguably reflect a 
reasonable level of accidents. 1811 And in that event it would also be appropriate 
to focus, as the Law Commission has done, on the costs of Compo rather than 
on the actual rate and severity of accidents, since the former would accurately 
reflect the latter. To the extent that accident costs are not charged to Compo, 
however, the cost of Compo loses its relevance as a guide to the accident situa-
tion in New Zealand and to the relative safety of the society. 
While accident statistics, such as they are, will be analyzed below, it is inter-
esting to note here that in recent years annual claims have been increasing, as 
indicated in table 6, below, notwithstanding a levelling off or even a possible 
decline in the population.18s 
Table 6 
ACC CLAIMS RECEIVED BY ACCOUNT (IN THOUSANDS) 
AND ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES187 
Year Total Claims Eamen Acc. Motor Vehide Acc. Supp. Acc. 
1987 151 0.0% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. o.a. 
1986 151 -4.4% 115 0.9% 17 0.0% 17 -29.6% 
1985 158 3.9% 114 4.6% 17 6.3% 27 - 3.6% 
1984 153 6.3% \09 1.9% 16 33.3% 28 12.0% 
1983 144 9.9% \07 9.2% 12 0.0% 25 19.0% 
1982 131 1.6% 98 1.0% 12 0.0% 21 5.0% 
Avge % incr: 2.8% 3.5% 7.9% 0.6% 
Total % incr: 15.3% 17.3% 41.7% -9.5% 
It seems a fair conclusion, therefore, that not only does the cost data not fore-
close the possibility of serious increases in accident rates and in severity of acci-
18~ However, it is still not as inexpensive as it first appears. Sixty cents per day is, after all, 
$219 per year. For a family of four this amounts to $876 per year to cover only accidental 
injuries. 
186 Population of New Zealand grew from 3,113,000 in 1980 to 3,314,000 in 1987, reflect-
ing an annual average growth rate of .9 percent. U.S. BUREAU OF mE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF mE UNITED STATES: 1988, table 1378 (l08th ed. 1987). When the author was in 
New Zealand, during the first half of 1987, he recalls seeing newspapers reports of annual de-
clines in the population of 20,000 and 12,000 for the period 1985-87. 
187 1986 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, lupra note 147, at 1; SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT" supra 
note 30, para. 84. 
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dents, but on the contrary the data gives warning that such increases may be a 
significant factor in the otherwise unexplained cost creep. The question remains 
whether there is any direct and convincing evidence of a failure of deterrence. 
IV. DETERRENCE OF ACCIDENTS 
A. Position 0/ the Act and the ACC 
Both the Accident Compensation Act and the Woodhouse Reporr which pre-
ceded it placed the highest priority on accident prevention, with rehabilitation 
second and compensation last. 188 As Professor Gellhorn has recently pointed 
out, however, "[t}he emphasis has been reversed in administrative reality."189 
While the Act authorizes the ACC to provide financial incentives, both penal-
ties and bonuses, to employers or self-employeds with particularly bad or good 
safety records190 and to impose penalty rates on drivers or classes of drivers with 
"significantly worse than average accident records,"19l the ACC recently gave 
up its former very limited use of such financial incentives on employers192 and 
has never surcharged bad drivers. 19a Norwithstanding the ACes broad respon-
sibilities and authority in the area of accident prevention,194 the ACC only 
spent 1.2 percent, 1.1 percent, and .7 percent of its total annual expenditures 
on accident prevention during the years 1984 through 1986, the highest 
amount being $3,681,000 in 1985.196 Aside from the safety bonuses in 1984 
and 1985, the money was spent on financial grants to other organizations and 
other accident prevention services. lee As noted in the Review by Officials Com-
mittee, "In the last few years, expenditure by A.C.C. on accident prevention has 
188 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 26(1); WOODHOUSE REPORT, lupra note 10, para. 2. 
11. Gellhom, lupra note 3, at 197. 
1110 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, S 40. This section authorizes penalties not exceeding 
100 percent and bonuses not exceeding 50 percent of annual levies. 
,., Id. § 49(e). 
, •• $1,204,000 and $1,269,000 per year were awarded as safery incentive bonuses in the years 
ending March 31, 1984 and 1985, respectively. No penalties were assessed in those years and no 
bonuses were awarded in the year ending March 31, 1986. 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS CoMMITTEE, 
lupra note 85, at 115. 
Ita SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, lupra note 30, para. 140. 
IN Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 35. See lupra note 108 (listing the safety promotion 
functions of the ACC). 
186 1 REVIEW OF OFFICIALS COMMITTEE, lupra note 85, at 115. If safety bonuses are excluded, 
the percentages spent in the years ending March 31, 1984 and 1985 were 0.8 and 0.7, respec-
tively. Id. These amounts and percentages, however, may not include about $3 million per an-
num to suppon a 40 person staff in the ACC Accident Prevention Branch. Cf SECOND WOOD-
HOUSE REPORT, lupra note 30, para. 108. 
1M 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMITTEE, lupra note 85, at 115. 
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been declining both in real terms (total amounts in constant dollars) and as a 
percentage of total expenditure."197 In general, the accident prevention activities 
of ACC seem to be focused mainly on supporting prevention activities of other 
groups; developing and running safety education campaigns, programs and 
courses; attempting to influence others to discover and to ameliorate hazardous 
conditions; cooperating with other national organizations and with local organi-
zations, both public and private; and, in general, "(g}etting people to place a 
higher relative value on 'safety' in the continuum of factors that motivate their 
behavior. "198 
The only other source of deterrence in Compo is the levy structure itself. For 
the earners account, the rate for each industrial activity is, in part, based directly 
upon the past three year's payments of accident compensation by ACC to all 
the workers employed and injured in each such activity. This results in those 
companies engaged in industrial activities which have experienced the highest 
worker injury costs for on-the-job accidents paying the highest rates. 199 Unlike 
experience rating of individual firms under a workers' compensation system, in 
which each company's accident record may directly affect its insurance costs, an 
individual employer or self-employed under Compo can only reduce or increase 
its levy by influencing the accident record 0/ all employers engaged in the same 
industrial activity. Thus, for example, a particularly careful employer engaged 
in aerial work operations will pay the same levy-$27.25 per $100 of payroll 
for 1988-89-as a particularly unsafe employer engaged in the same activity. 
Further, each employer pays the same flat-rate levy-$1.05 per $100 of payroll 
for 1988-89-to cover non-work-related accidents of all workers eligible for 
Compo in New Zealand.20o Finally, there is no artempt whatsoever to relate 
levies to accidents caused by levy payers to third persons, such as one's custom-
ers, one's patients, one's lessees, or the consumers of one's products, who are not 
employees of the levy payer. Notwithstanding the elaboration of 103 levy clas-
ses of industrial activities, therefore, there is very lirtle financial incentive for 
safety built into the current levy strucrure of the earners account.201 
Similarly, there are virtually no safety incentives built into the levies for the 
motor vehicle account, since there are only two levy rates, one for small vehicles 
and one for large,202 and accident costs of non-earners paid from the supple-
UI"7 Id. 
188 UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 21, at 68-69. 
188 Id. "The corporation tries to make each class of industrial activity self-supponing in rela-
tion to funding for work injuries." Id. 
100 GUIDE TO ACC LEvY SlllUCTURE, supra note 72, at 17. 
101 The Law Commission seems to agree. SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, paras. 
137-139. 
10. As of November, 1987 the twO rates were $25.30 and $100 per annum. Ordinary auto-
mobiles, motorcycles exceeding 60 C.c., buses, service coaches, "goods-service" vehicles, self-pro-
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mentary account are entirely externalized since they are paid out of general tax 
revenues.203 
While personal injury accident costs have thus been externalized, the com-
mon law system still flourishes in other areas. For example, actions at law for 
intentionally or negligently causing property damage may still be brought; and 
other actions, such as for malicious prosecution or conspiracy, also remain avail-
able so long as plaintiff seeks recovery for damages other than those produced 
by "injury by accident."204 Moreover, common law actions for punitive dam-
ages may be brought to punish outrageous conduct, though the award must not 
be so large as to create an impression that plaintiff is being compensated for his 
injuries.206 In addition, there may remain residual areas of medical malpractice 
liability, such as failure to diagnose illness and performance of surgical proce-
dures without informed consent, which do not fall within the Act's definition of 
medical misadventure or injury by accident and in which a common law negli-
gence action for resulting physical injuries may still be allowed. 206 
It follows, therefore, that whatever specific or general deterrents to accidents 
exists in New Zealand must come either from the availability of these residuary 
law actions or from other systems, such as the criminal law, administrative in-
spection and regulation, and disciplinary boards, which are not a pan of Compo 
and which, from all that appears, are generally no more effective, and in some 
case considerably less effective, than similar systems, such as OSHA, profes-
sional disciplinary systems, safety commissions, and the like in the United 
States.207 
The consequence of this is that those who can cause personal injury to others, 
whether they be firms or individuals and regardless of whether they are required 
pelled vans, and mobile cranes all paid the $100 rate. UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra note 21, at 
24-25. 
203 Id. at 25. 
204 Cf New Zealand Forest Prods. Ltd. v. Attorney General, 1 N.Z.L.R. 14 (1986) (action to 
recover economic losses for negligently cutting elearic cable allowed). "The law of negligence has 
undergone a renaissance of recent years .... " Id. at 15; Auckland City Council v. Blundell, 1 
N.Z.L.R. 732 (1986) (malicious prosecution and conspiracy). See also Love, supra note 3, at 976-
77 and authorities there cited. 
200 Auckland City Council v. Blundell, 1 N.Z.L.R. 732 (1986); Donselaar v. Donselaar, 1 
N.Z.L.R. 97 (1982). 
206 See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 189-90; Vennell, Infonned Consent, supra note 3. It is also 
not dear whether and to what extent non-industrial man-made diseases, negligently caused, are 
covered by Compo or might instead still be suable under the common law system. See J. STAPLE-
TON, supra note 3, at 145 (assening that under Compo "victims of man-made hazards such as 
environmental pollutants and non-medicinal products such as food, cosmetics, and other chemi-
cals go uncompensated under the scheme. . . . (and) are relegated to what is usually the illusoty 
remedy provided by ton"). 
207 See infra notes 351-55 and accompanying text. 
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to pay levies, do not fear individually having to bear in any significant degree 
the increased costs of accidents they cause-whether through increased levies, 
judgments for damages for personal injuries, or increases in their liabiliry insur-
ance rates-or even losing liabiliry insurance protection. Thus, as I noted in my 
submission to the Law Commission:208 
I suggest that the absence of liability for personal injuries in the case of prod-
uct manufacturers and sellers, land owners and occupiers, health care providers, 
building contractors, public entities, and other aaors may, as the awareness that 
there is no responsibility for personal injuries sinks home, lead to far greater 
hazards to the entire population. There is likely to be a temptation for the small-
time landlord or business to put off COStS of repairing unsafe conditions or dispos-
ing of hazardous materials or wastes. For the slumlord, there may be an irresisti-
ble temptation to capitalize on savings achieved by short-cutting safety. A similar 
problem may also exist with regard to that small percentage of every profession as 
to which a sense of personal responsibility coupled with professional discipline 
does not provide adequate deterrence. . . . 
Surely it seems excessively naive to argue that safety and accident prevention 
practices "are driven as much by a sense of responsibility to employees and the 
community at large, the protection of the organization's public image and a rec-
ognition of financial COStS unrelated to accident compensation levies and penal-
ties" as by financial incentives and penalties (i.e. loss of production, affect on 
employee morale, ability to attract suitable staff, cost of pay settlements, etc.).209 
B. Personal Observation 
Personal observations during New Zealand's summer, fall, and winter of 
1987 established, at least to my satisfaction, 21 0 that disgracefully hazardous 
208 Submission to Law Commission, supra note 14, at 5. 
209 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMITIEE, supra note 85, at 117. 
210 For a different perspective from a distinguished scholar whose stay in New Zealand coin-
cided in part with the author's, see Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 197 (asserting that efforts to 
educate the public about safety hazards "have often been notably successful" and that "a visitor 
is struck by the extent to which workers, householders, athletes, and children have become accus-
tomed to using protective devices such as headgear, breathing filters in dusty and fume-laden 
environments, and 'ear muffs' to reduce the impact of noise."). In addition to the inconsistent 
observations noted in the text, the author and his wife became particularly interested in rugby, a 
fast-moving physical contact sport accounting, in the year ended March 31, 1988, for 26 percent 
of New Zealand's 20,289 SpOrts accidents (32.2 percent if Rugby League is included), 1988 
ANNUAL REVIEW, supra note 149, fig. 8 (1988), and in which nothing resembling protective gear 
was anywhere in sight. Unlike American football, rugby players wear only shorts and jerseys and 
do not wear helmets or padding. 
38 University of Hawaii Law Review / Vol. 11: 1 
conditions211 had become endemic to that beautiful nation. One needed only to 
walk around the City of Wellington for an hour or two to see many obvious 
conditions which seriously threatened both workers and passersby. These in-
cluded widespread failures of construction workers to wear hard hats even in 
extremely dangerous situations; unfenced and unguarded hazards in busy down-
town sidewalks, such as large and deep holes, pieces of equipment and danger-
ous items, including wire fencing and other construction debris, lying directly in 
the path of pedestrians; debris from demolished buildings heaped on unfenced 
construction sites and spilling onto adjacent sidewalks while children climbed on 
the rubble and adults searched for salvageable items; cranes lifting heavy objects 
directly over the heads of pedestrians and above moving automobile traffic; and 
a worker firing a "ramset" gun into a concrete walk within a few feet of pass-
ersby on the sidewalk.212 
Further, large parts of the road system, particularly on the spectacular South 
Island, present dangerous challenges to .the ordinary driver and especially to the 
visitor unaccustomed to such conditions. 213 The roads are narrow, often becom-
, ing single lane, clinging precariously to the sides of steep mountains with blind 
curves, with no guard rails, and often unsealed (unpaved) with new metal 
(freshly graveled) surfaces. 
Admittedly, however, some of the hazards noted were not without offsetting 
and beneficial effects. Thus, for example, a used car salesman from whom I had 
purchased a car allowed me to use another car without charge-and without any 
corresponding benefit to the used car dealer-while my car was hors de combat 
in a repair garage unaffiliated with the car dealer. The first car so loaned was in 
dreadfully dangerous condition, with doors which flew open while driving 
around a rotary and water leaks which caused it to overheat and stall while 
driving up a steep hill. When I called the salesman to tell him about the 
problems he cheerfully invited me to return the first car and pick up another in 
better condition. In a more entrepreneurial vein, a farmer on magnificent Otago 
Peninsula, for a few dollars, allowed visitors to travel about ten kilometers over 
his farm-on a dangerous curvy and unpaved road-to view penguins and seals 
in their natural habitat. No warnings were given and no signs were posted 
alerting drivers to the formidable hazards which faced them on the road. 
211 As compared to conditions in Japan, where the author had just completed a four and one-
half month stay, and in Honolulu. 
212 The author submitted twenty-two photographs of hazards, taken during one or two short 
walks around the City of Wellington, to the Law Commission along with his submission. Slides 
made from the negatives are in the possession of the author. 
118 See, e.g., Thrills and spills for Asian travellers, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), June I, 
1987, at 6, col. 7 (reporting a high rate of automobile accidents for Asian tourists and a call by a 
travel industty representative to improve road conditions and sign posting of dangerous road con-
ditions; the conditions were characterized as "nothing short of a national disgrace"). 
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It is doubtful whether hazards such as these would be allowed to exist for 
long in a liability insurance-conscious nation like the United States. Their con-
tinued though not unremarked214 existence in New Zealand does suggest that 
accident deterrence has failed there, probably because there is no meaningful 
sanction should the hazards actually produce the accidents they threaten. As 
suggested above, however, effective deterrence may on occasion eliminate some 
beneficial aspects of dangerous conduct which the absence of fear of liabiliry 
might encourage.nll 
C. Newspaper Reports 
While these personal observations of unsafe conditions are admittedly anec-
dotal, they are buttressed convincingly by contemporaneous newspaper reports. 
The editorial verse in the sryle of A.A. Milne quoted at the beginning of this 
arricle,216 for example, seems to confirm rather forcefully my perception of the 
seriousness of hazards created by construction in Wellington. In addition, news-
paper articles culled on a fairly regular basis reveal serious problems of safety in 
many other areas as well. In addition to construction hazards217 these include 
114 See infra notes 216-28. 
IU Perhaps similar outcomes could be produced in the United States by broadening the de-
fense of implied assumption of risk. Whether such hazards, though beneficial in other respects, 
should be tolerated is another question. These cases do illustrate the point that the tort liability 
system may in some circumstances deter useful activities. See generally Olson, Overdelerrence and 
the Problem of Comparative Risk, 37 PRoc. ACAD. POL. SCI. 42 (1988). For a view that Americans 
have an obsession that life should be risk-free and that the obsession "is one of the most 
debilitating inRuences in America today," see Fairlie, Fear of Living-America's Morbid Aversion 
to Risk, NEW REPUBLIC. Jan. 23, 1989, at 14. But see Correspondence, id. Mar.' 13, 1989, at 6, 
42. See also P. HUBER. LIABILl1Y: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988) (an 
articulate polemic charging recent developments in tort law with inhibiting valuable advance-
ments in science and technology and calling for greater return to contracrual arrangements). But 
cf Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, 37 PRoc. ACAD. POL. SCI. 18 (1988). 
To the extent that overdeterrence occurs, its COStS should be considered a cost of the tort 
liability system when that system is compared with other systems. 
116 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
217 Cross, Walkers dodge falling debris, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), Sept. 30, 1987, at 6, 
col. 2 ("Falling debris from Wellington building sites continues to pose hazards to pedestri-
ans .... Inspectors were doing their best, but regulations and supervision could not stop acci-
dents."); Menzies, Letter to the Editor, id. July 16, 1987, col. 3 (describing observed work 
situation where cwo workers on planks working about eight stories above the street were unpro-
tected by scaffolding or safety rails, and "where the slightest loss of balance would have sent 
either of the cwo men to the pavement and certain death," and stating .. [t}his incident was the 
worse of several I have observed atound the city lately. Not only workers but also members of the 
public are being put at risk unnecessarily."); Victoria University of Wellington, News VUW, 
May 22, 1987, at 24 ("[C]rane topples in early May to block Culliford Drive.", the road adjacent 
to the University, with picrure); Inspector considers siles unsafe, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), 
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problems of highway and driver safety,1I18 fire and other hazards in high-rise 
buildings,219 unsafe drugs administered to children,lIlio excessive electrical acci-
May 13, 1987, at 6, col. 6 (report of Labour Department official's statement: "A shortage of 
construction safery inspectors, combined with construction company pressure on workers to get 
buildings up quickly, meant many labourers worked in hazardous conditions .... "); id. May 
8, 1987, at 7, col. 4 ("The Labour Department will send a "very stiff" warning to an Auckland 
building company after a wall collapsed and injured a carpenter."). 
218 Bishop, Drivers do well in alcohol blitz, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 20, 1987, at 
3, col. 1 ("Few drivers mixed alcohol with driving ... but 'alarming' ligures were reported for 
the South Island."); Death rate on roads not so gloomy, id. June 26, 1987, at 3, col. 8 (original 
report that New Zealand's road accident death rate was the worst of eight nations surveyed was 
wrong; correct death rate for every 10 million kilometers traveled was 26 deaths rather than 37, 
thus putting New Zealand behind Germany (34) but ahead of Australia and Japan (24 each), 
Canada (23), the United Kingdom (21), Sweden (17), and the United States (15»; Licensing 
revamp set for AuguJl, id. June 11, 1987, at 3, col. 7 (announcement of plans for a "tough new 
licensing system for young drivers" designed to reduce the accident rate among drivers aged 15 to 
24); id. at 16, col. 4 ("The attirudes of New Zealand drivers have deteriorated," according to 
retiring Ministry of Transport senior sergeant.); ThrilIJ and SpilIJ for Arian Travellm, id. June 1, 
1987, at 6, col. 7. 
219 Fire study begun, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 18, 1987, at 3, col. 5 (report of 
Internal Affairs Minister asking the Building Industry Commission to examine need for fire sprin-
klers in high rise buildings); DoubtJ cast on highrise safety, id. July 12, 1987, at 1, col. 1 ("Many 
of the highrise towers being built in New Zealand could have structural faults serious enough to 
cast doubts on their safery, twO senior Ministry of Works and Development staff say."); Vasil, 
Sprinkler review likely-Tapsell, id. July 11, 1987, at 3 (report that Internal Affairs Minister was 
likely to seek a review of existing sprinkler requiremenrs); Vasil, Insurers firm on sprinklers, id. 
July 10, 1987, at 3, col. 7; Law tougher abroad, id. col. 8 ("New Zealand's requirement for 
sprinkler systems only in buildings higher than 14 stories is less stringent than in other Western 
countries."); Moran, Backing for sprinkler bylaw urged, id. July 8, 1987, at 3, col. 7; Editorial, 
Waiting for a tragedy, id. July 7, 1987, at 10, col. 1; Vasil, Tourists' call for sprinklm heeded, id. 
July 7, 1987, at 3, col. 1 ("Refusal by some overseas tourists and employees of large international 
companies to stay in hotels without sprinkler systems has prompted one Wellington chain to 
install them."); High fire risk areas extended, id. ("The Fire Service Commission has included 
hospitals and the chemical industry as high lire risk areas where sprinklers systems should be 
mandatory."); Vasil, Hotel chief defends fin! safety, id. July 6, 1987, at 3, col. 7 (includes report 
that the Dominion revealed that most of Wellington's leading hotels were "unprotected through-
out" by sprinkler systems, and that the chief executive of the Hotel Association asserted that the 
standard of lire safery in New Zealand hotels was nevertheless adequate); UIe of sprinklers sup-
ported, id. col. 3 (owner of Wellington's second largest hotel agrees that all hotels should be 
required to have sprinklers systems). 
220 Editorial, Uncertainty on vaccines, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 15, 1987, at 10, 
col. I (Editorial asks: "Are New Zealand children being used as guinea pigs?" after noting con-
flicting reportS on whether the meningitis vaccine administered to children after an outbreak of 
the disease was adequately tested.); Vasil, l/Inesses unrelated to vaccine, id. at 1, col. 5 (report that 
Health Department investigators found no evidence that "minor side effects such as vomiting, 
fainting and a sensation of rubbery legs" were caused by vaccine rather than by the immunization 
process and that the Health Department "was not unduly worried about the immunisation pro-
gramme and would continue with it unless long-term side-effects were proven"); 50 calls report 
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dents,221 risks from hazardous substances,212 excessive recreational accidents,228 
excessive back injuries,2u high rates of fatalities among bush (forest) work-
ers,2211 problems of incompetent hospital treatment or other malpractice,228 in-
vaccine il/s, id. July 14, 1987, at 3, col. 3 (reports of 50 calls to South Auckland Health Depart-
ment of side effects of meningitis vaccine including vomiting and "having trouble walking"); 
Vaccine to Jlay but inquiry planned, id. July 13, 1987, at 6, col. 5; Injection reactions kept from 
parenlJ, id. July 6, 1987, at 1, col. 5 ("The Health Department says it did not publicise the 
adverse reactions of 25 children to meningitis vaccination injections ... because it did not want 
to threaten the campaign."). 
2U Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 21, 1987, at 3, col. 1 ("Auckland Electric Power 
Board has called for a special repon on fatal accidents involving its linesmen, three of whom have 
died this year."); Raea, Electrical accidents kil/ nine people, id. June 13, 1987, at 7, col. 1. 
2 •• Managh, Transport firms act to reduce accidents, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), June 8, 
1987, at 3, col. 1 (repon on efforts by the transport industry to reduce accidents from hazardous 
substances carried by road). 
228 Ski field safety defended, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 20, 1987, at 3, col. 3 (report 
of Turoa ski field public relations officials answering complaints in two letters to newspaper about 
safety measures taken at ski field); Concern at rate of water deaths, id. July 6, 1987, at 6, col. 8 
("New Zealand has one of the worst drowning records in the Western world," according to the 
Internal Affairs Minister. "Whatever excuses are advanced for reluctance to fence home swim-
ming pools, there can be no argument with statistics that prove that such pools are attrac-
tive-and deadly dangerous-to toddlers."); Most cycle accidenlJ unreported, id. June 11, 1987, 
at 3, col. 8 ("A 1984 survey showed the chance of a cyclist dying on the road was three times 
higher in New Zealand than it was in Britain."); /Wgby's ACC use defended, id. ("World Cup 
rugby organisers are annoyed at an inference that the [ACC) may be footing a heavy bill for 
injuries to players involved in the tournament."); Third accident at show injures youth, id. May 
12, 1987, at 6, col. 3 . 
••• Bad backs 'a worry', Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), June 26, 1987, at 6, col. 5; Back 
injury tops safety concern list, id. May 4, 1987, at 3, col. 6 ("A survey by Wellington's trade 
union health and safety centre has identified back injuries as the number one workplace helth 
[sic} hazard .... "). 
'2& Managh, Statistics highlight bush work dangers, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), Apr. 30, 
1987, at 3, col. 3 ("Bush workers have been killed in site accidents at a rate averaging almost 
one a month for the past 18 years, Labour Department figures show."). 
226 Surgeon on suspension, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 16, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (report 
relating to charges thar orthopedic services at Whakatane Hospital had been causing unnecessary 
medical problems, including the death of a patient); Doctors' discipline procedures for review, id. 
July 13, 1987, at I, col. 7 (report that "mounting pressure for change within and without the 
profession" has led the Medical Council to consider revising disciplinary procedures to make them 
"responsive, accessible and free of financial burden for taxpayers and complainants"); Lener to the 
Editor, id. June 21, 1987, at 10, col. 6 (writer complains that as a "medical victim" she has no 
recourse against her physician but is "ironically seen in the statistics as an 'accident victim' "); 
100 complaints about treatment, id, May 8, 1987, at I, col. 7 ("Almost 100 people have com-
plained ... about the care they received at Whakatane Hospital."); Month's wait for full ortho-
pedic inquiry, id., May I, 1987, at 9, col. 1 (solicitor for family whose son allegedly died as a 
result of malpractice after he entered hospital with fracture, "has compiled a list of between 40 
and 50 people who claim to have had bad experiences at the hospital's onhopedic department.") 
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dustrial safety problems,227 and, of major national concern, the possibility that 
physicians who diagnosed symptoms of cervical cancer in women had expen-
mentally denied them treatment. 228 
It is of course not possible to present a clear correlation between the absence 
of tOrt liability and the reported incidence of accidents. Nevertheless, many of 
these situations-such as New Zealand' s alleged high rate of water deaths pro-
duced in pan by the failure of homeowners with swimming pools to fence in 
their pools229 or an excessively relaxed attitude by physicians to certain kinds of 
evidence of cervical cancer,280 for example-lend themselves rather plausibly to 
the explanation that the absence of any perceived tOrt sanction, whether of per-
sonal liability for damages, an increase in insurance premiums, or even being 
subjected to an action for civil liability, has created an "I don't give a damn" 
attitude toward risk of harm to others. 
While essentially anecdotal like my personal observations, this evidence. is 
also buttressed by statistics furnished by the ACe. 
117 Meares, InduJtrial hazardJ und,rsN7Jtiny, Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 2, 1987, at 
12, col. 7 (report includes assertion that, because workers fear losing their jobs, far more indus-
rrial accidents occur than ever get reported). 
118 See Committee of Inquiry into Allegations Concerning Treatment of Cervical Cancer at 
National Wornen's Hospital and Other Related Matters, Public notice, N.Z. Herald (Auckland), 
July 25, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Meares & McQuade, Cancer inquiry fears, Dominion (Wellington, 
N.Z.), July 20, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (report on problems of reaching women in a public investiga-
tion of charges that many women diagnosed with signs of cervical carcer were deliberately not 
treated during a twenry year "experiment"); Doctor guilty of miJconduct, id. June 26, 1987, at 3, 
col. 7 ("A doctor who failed to diagnose cervical cancer in a patient has been found guilty of 
professional misconduct."); HOJpital inquiry fund Jet up, id. June 14, 1987, at 3, col. 3 (fund 
established to help women who want to testify); Main, Report on cancer treatment awaited, id. 
June 5, 1987, at 3, col. 1 ("The government may begin an independent inquiry into the treat-
ment of cervical cancer patients at the National Women's Hospital in Auckland."); Cancer alle-
gationJ diJputed, id. June 8, 1987, at 3, col. 8 (Cancer society medical director reported to admit 
that some physicians at National Women's Hospital "questioned the value of cervical screening" 
but that "as far as he was aware" the problem was limited to that hospital). 
Women who believe they were victimized by the failure to treat their cervical cancers are 
seeking to bring law actions for damage. However, they must await the determination of the 
ACC as to whether their rights lie under Compo or in law actions for damages. Letter from John 
Miller, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, to Richard S. Miller 
(Nov. 25, 1988). 
119 See Jupra note 223. 
tao See supra note 228. 
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D. Accident Statistics 
1. Deficiencies 0/ Statistics 
As part of the total scheme of Compo the ACC, and before it the Accident 
Compensation Commission, was charged, in furtherance of its accident preven-
tion function, to engage in research "into causes, incidence, costs, and methods 
of prevention of personal injury by accident."231 Unfortunately, notwithstanding 
high hopes expressed in the Woodhouse Report that the accident compensation 
scheme would overcome prior deficiencies in accident statistics and lead to the 
development of "a statistical picture unlikely to exist in the same detail in any 
other coumry,"232 the effectiveness of accident intelligence-gathering has been a 
major disappointmem.233 Evidently, the gathering of statistics has taken a back 
seat to the receiving of claims and prompt paying of compensation.2u 
2. The Statistics 
Nevertheless, the ACC has published accident statistics and those statistics, 
though they may be of questionable accuracy and completeness,235 do seem to 
131 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 35(4)(e). 
lSI WOODHOUSE REPORT, lupra note 10, paras. 319-322. 
133 See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, paras. 99, 125-126,281-282 ("To ap-
ply the words used 20 years ago by the Royal Commission, the statistical record for injuries is still 
incomplete and even misleading." Id. para. 281; 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMITTEE, lupra note 
85, at 120 ("In our review of the accident compensation scheme, there was frequently some 
difficulty in obtaining appropriate statistical data to support or disprove various comments and 
opinions. This is of particular concern in the safety and accident prevention area . . . . Not all 
accidents are reported . . . . Even accidents reported lack full information in a significant num-
ber of cases."); G. PALMER. ACODENT CoMPENSATION, supra note 3, at 392-93. 
1M SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, lupra note 30, §§ 5, 126. This may represent a misguided 
application of the general principle of administrative efficiency, wherein claims are paid without 
hassle upon a general certification by a physician that they arose from accident without monitor-
ing the accuracy of the certificates as to coverage and as to correctness of the physician' s diagnosis 
or prognosis. 
laG The ACC stated: 
Data on injuries are compiled from certificates given by medical practitioners at the time 
each claim is made. Therefore, diagnoses must strictly be regarded as preliminary 
ones-although, obviously, most will not be expected to change .... The system of 
bulk-billing by medical practitioners means that most medical fees paid by the Corpora-
tion do not involve the registration of a claim. 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION, 2 ACC STATISTICS. No.1, 30 (1983) [hereinafter 2 
ACC STATISTICS]. 
See alJo ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CoRPORATION, 4 ACC STATISTICS, 36 (1985) [hereinafter 4 
ACC STATISTICS]. As to the statistics for 1988, the ACC states: 
The statistics largely exclude those accidents resulting only in (1) incapacity during the 
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support the anecdotal evidence that the incidence and severity of accidents has 
been increasing significantly. Thus, for example, between 1981 and 1983, head 
injuries were reported to increase from 18,762 to 22,954, or by 22.3 percent; 
fractures increased from 10,315 to 12,522, or by 21.3 percent, and perhaps 
most frightening of all from the perspective of accident costs to ACC and 
human tragedy, spine fractures with cord lesion increased from 15 to 74, or by 
393.3 percent.23S 
Unfortunately, accident statistics furnished to me for the year ended March 
31, 1988237 do not appear to be direaly comparable to the statistics for 1981 
and 1983 earlier published. Nor are they as detailed. Nevertheless, some rough 
comparisons are possible: A total of 22,954 compensated head accidents of all 
kinds was reported for 1983;238 for 1988 the total of head accidents reported 
was 28,081,239 a 22.4 percent increase. A total of 1,259 compensated eye or 
eye orbit accidents was reported for 1983;240 for 1988 a total of 1,217,241 
representing a decrease of 3.3 percent, although it is not clear whether eye inju-
ries reported for 1988 also include injuries to the orbit, as they did in 1983. 
The total of neck injuries reported in 1983 was 2,001 242 as compared to 2,574 
in 1988,243 an 18.6 percent increase. In 1983, a total of 14,973 compensated 
back or spine injuries were reported;244 the total for 1988 was 18,864,24& repre-
first week (for which the Corporation is not liable) or (ii) medical treatment (for which the 
doctor is normally reimbursed direct {sic}). However, they do include those cases where 
compensation has been paid for dental treatment-which must be claimed for by the 
patient. 
In addition, they also exclude accidents (even fatal ones) to non-earners unless compen-
sation has been paid .... This applies to children and elderly people in particular. 
It is estimated that about half of all lost-time work accidents may be excluded by the 
above provisions; how many non-work accidents are so excluded cannot be reliably 
estimated. 
The circumstances of each accident are as reported by the claimant. Injuries are as diag-
nosed by medical practitioners at the time the claims were made, and some diagnoses may 
therefore not be final. 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION. COMPENSATED ACODENTS FOR TIiE YEAR ENDED 31 
MARCH 1988 1 (1988) (unpublished) {hereinafter CoMPENSATED ACODENTS FOR 1988}. 
238 Compare 2 AeC STATISTICS, supra note 235, 30-31, with 4 ACe STATISTICS, supra note 
235 at 36-37. 
237 COMPENSATED ACCIDENTS FOR 1988, supra note 235. 
238 4 ACe STATISTICS, supra note 235, at 36. 
239 COMPENSATED ACODENTS FOR 1988, supra note 235, table 8. 
240 4 ACe STATISTICS, supra note 235, at 37. 
0 .. CoMPENSATED ACCIDENTS FOR 1988, supra note 235, table 8. 
242 4 ACe STATISTICS, supra note 235, at 37. 
243 COMPENSATED ACCIDENTS FOR 1988, supra note 235, table 8. 
0 •• 4 ACe STATISTICS, supra note 235, at 37. 
on COMPENSATED ACCIDENTS FOR 1988, supra note 235, table 8. 
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senting an increase of 26 percent. 246 
There do not seem to have been any sharp increases in population, employ-
ment, in the hazards of employment, or in recreational activities in New Zea-
land during the reporting period which could account for such sharp increases 
in serious injuries. The only remaining explanations for the increases are (1) that 
the figures supplied to the ACC by physicians, or the figures as published, are 
inaccurate or not comparable from one reporting period to the next, (2) that 
although the data may be accurate, more citizens have become aware of the 
availability of Compo and a higher percentage of accidents are resulting in 
claims and more fraudulent claims are being filed, (3) that a significantly more 
dangerous environment has indeed produced a shocking increase in serious acci-
dents, or (4) a mix of the above. 
E. Conclusions Regarding Deterrence 
When the implications of the cost data-especially the otherwise unexplained 
"cost creep"-are considered in connection with the anecdotal evidence gath-
ered by personal observation, the many newspaper reports-including some ex-
plicit reports of New Zealand's high accident rate in relation to other na-
tions-and the available statistics provided by ACC, it is hard to avoid 
concluding that Compo's "cost creep" or its "cost blow-out" has been caused 
mainly by an "accident blow-out." When to this evidence is added the intui-
tion as well as the theory that removing direct financial incentives on individu-
als and firms to avoid accidents and removing the costs of accidents ftom the 
activities which cause them will result in an inefficient level of accidents, then 
the conclusion that the absence of deterrence such as that produced by the tort 
system has indeed resulted in an unacceptably high and inefficient level of acci-
dents seems proved by at least a preponderance of the evidence. If I am correct 
in this, then the Accident Compensation Scheme, norwithstanding its humane 
values and its success at providing compensation, is tragically flawed. 
V. REFORMING THE SYSTEM 
A. Problems Perceived 
It was not specifically the problem of accidents or failure of deterrence but 
rather escalating costs, as described above, coupled with a continuing desire to 
246 In 1983, 13,048, or 87.1 percent, of the 14,973 reported back or spine injuries were 
sprains or strains. 2 ACC STATISTICS, supra note 235, at 37. Comparable statistics were not 
available to the author for 1988. See COMPENSATED ACCIDENTS fOR 1988, supra note 235, table 
8. 
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reduce the disparity of treatment between those disabled by accident and those 
disabled by other causes that generated reconsideration of the Accident Com-
pensation Scheme by three impressive governmental bodies-the Officials Com-
minee,247 The Royal Commission on Social Policy,248 and the Law Commis-
sion.249 Since the Law Commission has produced a draft bill-the Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act2~O-which would entirely replace the Ac-
cident Compensation Act of 1982, and since there is a fair chance that the Law 
Commission's repon will become the starting place for discussions leading to a 
new compensation act for New Zealand,261 the principal focus of discussion 
here will be the Law Commission's final report and the manner in which it 
deals with the problem of accidents. 
Owen Woodhouse, the distinguished jurist responsible for the original report 
which eventually gave rise to Compo, served as the President of the Law Com-
mission during the recent study which led to the current recommendations for a 
new Act.2~2 Well before the final report emerged, in May, 1988, he had sig-
nalled his intention of dealing with the immediate problem of increasing costs 
and levies by eliminating differential rates for the 103 categories of industrial 
activity and moving toward a uniform flat rate for all employers. 2~3 It was 
therefore no surprise when the final report included a recommendation for a flat 
rate levy for employers and self-employed persons. 2~4 
The problem for the Law Commission, however, was not just to deal with 
employer complaints of excessively high levies, although that was obviously a 
promising way of cooling the political heat that had generated most of the 
governmental concern about the Scheme. The broader issue was how, in the 
247 See 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMITIEE, !upra note 85; lee alJo 2 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS 
COMMITIEE. !upra note 85 (Introductory Letter of Submission). 
'<8 See references to the work of the Royal Commission on Social Policy, including six work-
ing papers, in SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, !upra note 30, §§ 7, 14,37, 57,60,63,64, 163, 
184, 186, 273. 
249 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, !upra note 30. Since Sir Owen Woodhouse, the author of 
the original Woodhouse Repott, is President of the Law Commission, this repott has been re-
ferred to here as the Second Woodhouse Report. 
260 ld. at \04-95. 
2., See letter from John Miller, !upra note 228. 
••• In an interview given to the National Business Review (New Zealand), Sir Owen himself 
questioned whether it was "sensible" to place him in charge of assessing the scheme of which he 
was the architect. See Herbert, Compo payment! relief on the way, Nat'l Bus. Rev., June 26, 1987, 
at I, col. 2. 
"3 ld. In Sir Owen's view, the levies, while in the form of a payroll tax, are "indirectly a sales 
tax as the cost is passed on to the general public in prices." ld. at 5, col. 5. Further, he holds the 
view that the preferred approach would be to finance the system out of general taxation. ld. This 
is of course consistent with the view that Compo is a social insurance scheme. See SECOND WOOD-
HOUSE REPORT, !upra note 30, paras. 2, 44-46. 
2.< See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, !upra note 30, para. 21. 
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face of escalating costS, including the unexplained "cost creep" described 
above,21111 to maintain the original guiding principles of the Scheme which in-
cluded relatively rich levels of compensation-"real compensation"-and in ad-
dition to broaden coverage to eliminate the anomalous difference in treatment 
between accident victims and other disableds-comprehensive entitlement-, 
while not complicating the administration of the Scheme-administrative effi-
ciency-and while dealing appropriately with the supposed highest priority of 
all, accident prevention. 2116 
B. Options Available to the Law Commission 
If these objectives were to be met, a combination of some of the following 
options would have to be adopted: 
1. Reduce amount 0/ benefits paid. Total benefits could be reduced by (a) 
eliminating lump sum payments for noneconomic loss, which had recently ex-
perienced a meteoric increase;2117 (b) reducing weekly benefit levels of ERe by 
reducing the percentage (now eighty percent)2118 of weekly earnings paid or re-
ducing the maximum amount of annual income on which ERe would be paid 
($63,458);2119 (c) extending the length of the period of non-coverage for ERe 
beyond the current one week waiting period;260 (d) shifting entirely or panly 
from income maintenance261 to minimum subsistence; (e) reducing dependent's 
benefits262 and some of the miscellaneous benefits;263 (f) reducing false and 
fraudulent claims for ERe by workers; (g) monitoring physicians effectively to 
insure the correctness of determinations that patients' conditions were caused by 
accident rather than by non-covered conditions and that private hospital stays 
were necessary: and (g), most imponantly, by reducing the number and severity 
of accidents. 
2. Increase income. Possibilities included (a) extending levies beyond motor 
vehicle owners, employers, and self-employeds and imposing them on groups 
and individuals currently exempt, such as athletes and athletic groups, motor 
266 See supra cexc accompanying noces 157-80. 
266 See supra noce 189. 
267 Noneconomic loss paid increased from $56.9 million in 1985 co $88 million in 1986, a 
55 percenc increase. The paymenc in 1986 for noneconomic loss consticuced 21.1 percenc of che 
cocal of $416 million paid as compensation by che ACC in 1986. 1986 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 
supra noce 147, ac 3, 5. 
268 Accidenc Compensation Act, 1982, §§ 59( I), 60( I)(e). 
269 UNINTENTIONAL INJURY, supra noce 21, at 22 (as of June, 1987). 
28. Accidenc Compensacion Act, 1982, § 57. 
28. See, e.g., Accident Compensacion Act. 1982, §§ 59( I), 60( I). 
28. ld. § 65. 
263 See, e.g., id. §§ 72, 73. 77, 80. 
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vehicle drivers, workers, owners and occupiers of real property; (b) requiring 
beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries to contribute to the scheme, as by impos-
ing monthly charges on workers, requiring patient contributions to medical and 
drug expenses, or levying a Compo tax on visitors to New Zealand; (c) impos-
ing general or specific (as on gasoline) tax increases to support greater contribu-
tions from general tax revenues (d) experience rating-surcharging existing levy 
payers and assessing and imposing levies on others based upon the extent to 
which they cause accidents to others, as with drivers, occupiers of property, 
products manufacrurers, and health care providers; (e) raising money through 
fines or penalties imposed on activities found to be violating safety standards; 
and (f), the most controversial proposal, reinstating the tort action in whole or 
part and allowing the ACC to recover the value of ACC payments from 
tortfeasors whose acts or omissions caused the accidents which led to such 
payments. 
3. Improve accident prevention. Here the possibilities include (a) improving 
safety education and safety programs; (b) expanding specific deterrence through 
increased direct regulation of accident-causing activities coupled with fines, pen-
alties, and imprisonment in appropriate situations; (c) expanding use of finan-
cial incentives such as bonuses for good safety records and penalties for poor 
safety records, and, for victims, longer waiting periods for commencement of 
benefits and requiring self insurance; and (d) improving general deterrence by 
requiring internalization of accident costs-through experience rating, by im-
posing a part or greater part of the costs of accidents on accident causers, such 
as employers in the case of work-related accidents and victims where there is 
contributory fault, or the reimposition of tort liability in whole or part. It 
should be noted that the last three possibilities for increasing income, (d) - (f) 
in paragraph 2, above, generally coincide with the last three possibilities for 
improving accident prevention, (b) through (d), in this paragraph. 
C. Recommendations of the Law Commission 
Here, however, in broad brush strokes, are the principal changes which the 
Law Commission has actually recommended: 
1. Benefits 
a. Waiting period extended. The waiting period for Compo benefits should 
be extended from one week to twO.2M However, the obligation to pay ERC 
which now falls on the employer for the first week of incapacity in cases of 
2"" SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 28(3). 
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work-related injury would be extended to the full two weeks. 2611 The earner 
injured on the job would thus suffer no loss of benefits. but employees injured 
off the job would have co carry themselves for the second week if the employer 
did not provide sick pay for that week.266 While the Law Commission makes 
fairly expansive claims for the degree of self-incentive on both employees and 
employers and the degree of individual responsibility this change will pro-
duce,267 the actuarially estimated savings-about $26,000,000 per 
year268-seems minuscule in relation to the likely problems of costs. The Law 
Commission evidently rejected the recommendation of the Royal Commission 
on Social Policy that the waiting period be extended to four weeks. 269 
b. EarningJ Related CompenJation lor Permanent DiJability. The Law Com-
mission rejected a proposal of the Royal Commission on Social Policy to drop 
periodic payments of earnings related compensation at their current high level 
after the second year of disability and then to begin to pay a reduced fiat rate 
somewhat more generous than the current social welfare payment for those dis-
abled by illness.27o Instead the Law Commission recommends that if and when 
a cut is necessary in ERC payments, a uniform percentage, such as five percent, 
be adopted. 271 In the meantime, there would be no change in the commitment 
to pay generous ERC to disabled workers until retirement if necessary. Indeed, 
the draft act sets the new maximum monthly salary on which ERC payments 
(of eighty percent) are based at $2,000 per week.272 
A dramatic change, however, is recommended for the treatment of disabled 
non-earners who will for the first time become entitled to periodic payments 
based upon New Zealand's average weekly earnings, as described in the next 
section. 
c. Lump Sum Payment lor Noneconomic Lou. Noting that lump sum payments 
for permanent disability and for loss of the amenities of life and for pain and 
suffering could not be justified if the scheme were to move in the direction of 
covering sickness as well as accident,273 the Law Commission has proposed that, 
generally, lump sum awards for noneconomic loss be abolished.274 However, in 
recognition of the fact that those who suffer serious disability "will often meet 
266 Id. 
266 Id. paras. 183-185. 
261 Id. paras. 183-184. 
268 Id. para. 184. 
269 Id. (citing ROYAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL POUCY, WORKING PAPERS ON INCOME MAINTE-
NANCE AND TAXATION (Mar. 1988». 
210 Id. 
211 Id. (would reduce ERC payments to 75 percent of weekly earnings) . 
.,2 Id. at iii (erratum), 127. 
273 Id. para. \93 . 
.,4 Id. paras. 188-\94. The proposal would also eliminate lump sum awards to a spouse and 
children upon the death of a worker. Id. para. 42. 
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greater costs in various areas than the able,"27& the Commission recommends 
permanent periodic payments for loss of capacity if the loss exceeds five per-
cent.276 The percentage of incapacity is to be determined by an authoritative 
schedule of the American Medical Association.177 The percentage is to be ap-
plied to eighty percent of the "average weekly wage" which, the Commission 
states, is a base figure which is different from the individual's own historic 
earnings which constitutes the base figure for ERC and is based instead upon "a 
general figure which we have taken as the average wage,"27S presumably for all 
of New Zealand. In an appropriate case these benefits may be computed to a 
lump sum.179 
The proposed draft Act, borrowed in part from legislation introduced into 
the Australian Parliament in 1977,ISO purports to be less complicated than the 
existing legislation.lsl Unfortunately, however, it is unclear on the important 
question whether an earner who suffers incapacity will receive ERC and, in 
addition, a percentage, based on the AMA schedule, of average weekly earnings 
"for 'all sectors, all persons' " in New Zealand in lieu of current lump sums for 
noneconomic loss. lSI The implication is that both kinds of payments will be 
available to earners. ISS 
This proposal constitutes the most significant improvement in benefits for 
17& [d. para. 190. 
IT. [d. para. 195. 
177 [d. (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT (2d ed. 1984». 
178 [d. para. 203. There is a provision for adjustment in the event of exceptional cases. [d. See 
also Draft Act, §§ 25(2), 48, id. at 119, 130, respectively. 
In [d. §§ 131-132 (S 52). 
180 [d. at 94 (appendix B) ("The model was the National Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Bill presented and read a first time in the House of Representatives of the Australian Parliament 
on 24 February 1977 ... adapted ... to New Zealand circumstances.") 
181 [d. para. 23. 
I" [d. para. 29. 
I8lI Cf id. paras. 29, 194, 201-203. Bllt cf id. at 99: "Clause 42 attributes to a person who 
has no earnings a national income. This is set at the amount of average weekly earnings (all 
sectors, all persons). The provision applies to alltholt who are not employed or self-employed. They 
will be entitled to a periodical benefit for total incapacity or permanent partial incapacity." (em-
phasis added). This last provision as well as the draft act seems to limit such benefits to non-
earners. On the other hand, one of the examples given is of a worker who shatters his leg in a 
motorcycle accident and then receives periodic payments of $ 190 per week, based on permanent 
incapacity of 60 percent, which may last thirty-four years. This amount is then compared in the 
example with the $10,000 lump sum for noneconomic loss the worker would currently receive. 
Since an injured earner may currently receive a lump sum payment in addition to ERe, the 
implication is that earners will receive periodic benefits in addition to ERe. [d. para. 199. How-
ever, if the proposal actually contemplates removing lump sum payments for noneconomic losses 
for earners without replacing those benefits, there may be serious resistance from the labor 
movement. 
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nonearners who, under the current scheme, fare very poorly if they suffer long 
term serious disability, being entitled only to a lump sum up to a total of 
$27,000 plus medical expenses. While giving up the right to lump sum pay-
ments for noneconomic loss, they would now be entitled to received periodic 
payments based on a percentage impairment determined by a physician using 
the AMA schedule of impairments, the percentage to be applied against the all-
New Zealand average weekly earnings. Such payments could continue until re-
tirement age. 
Actuaries have estimated that the allowance of such periodic payments in lieu 
of current lump sums would eventually-when the new scheme reaches its full 
maturity-cost about $403 million per year in 1987-88 dollars, as compared 
with $ 145.5 million which would be paid in lump sums under the current 
Act.284 
d. Extension of Coverage to Illness-Based Disability. The Law Commission rec-
ommends that, in furtherance of the objective of comprehensiveness, the scheme 
be extended to cover, as included within the definition of personal injury, con-
genital diseases.2811 The proposal, however, was not included within the draft act 
on the ground that "the change is a major one with significant consequences for 
other areas of policy and administration" and because its costs have not been 
determined.286 
·e. Medical Expenses. The Commission recommends that medical treatment 
for accident vict.ims and victims of illness and disease be treated equally. 287 This 
would be accomplished by removing the obligation to cover such expenses from the 
Compo scheme and turning the public responsibility over to the social welfare 
system by reference to the Social Security Act 1964.288 However, to insure that 
284 Id. para. 204. The report mentions the figure given but the actuaries who computed the 
COSts, in their report, estimate 1987-88 payments of lump sums for noneconomic loss at $175 
million. Id. para. 211. 
These estimates may also include the cost of a provision designed specifically to permit sexual 
assault victims and others who suffer serious emotional harm or permanent disfigurement .to 
receive periodic payments for disability by directing the physician who determines the percenrage 
of disability to take into account the extent to which the condition "has permanently lessened 
that person's ability to lead a normal life." /d. para. 120 (Draft Bill § 27). There is also a 
provision which would permit periodic payments, such as these, to be commuted to a lump sum 
"where it is particularly advantageous and just to the beneficiary that the benefit be paid by way 
of lump-sum payment." Id. paras. 131-132 (Draft Bill § 52). 
28& Id. para. 172 (the proposal would be similar to that contained in the bill introduced in the 
Australian Parliament in 1977: A congenital disease was there defined as "a physical or mental 
defect, including a disease, in a person existing at or shortly before birth, being a defect or disease 
that becomes evident before that person artains the age of 3 years. "). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. paras. 7, 176-179. 
288 ld. para. 176. 
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accident victims continue to receive appropriate health care the specific elements 
of "personal attention" to which such victims are entitled are spelled out in the 
draft Act.289 The Law Commission also recommends that in order to create 
appropriate "incentives" and to further "individual responsibility" victims 
should ordinarily cover one-third of their own medical costS.290 However, be-
cause of international labor conventions to which New Zealand is evidently 
bound, the employer would be required to pay the amount of medical expenses 
not covered by Compo for its employee if the accident or disease was work-
related.291 In addition, special provision for payment would be made to impose 
a ceiling on the amounts an individual would have to pay and for further assis-
tance in the event the victim was unable to pay the residual amount.292 
Although some incentives to avoid or prevent accidents are built in to the 
medical expense proposal-to the extent that individuals and employers have to 
bear medical expenses-it must be recognized that the remaining costs 0/ medical 
and surgical care and all other health costs would be externalized by this proposal; 
they would be paid for under the social security system from general revenues. 
For 1987 these expenses accounted for about twenty percent of all ACC com-
pensation costS.293 
f. Coverage. The Law Commission recommends moving away from exclusive 
reference to a broad and general definition of what conditions are covered, such 
as the current "personal injuty by accident" and "medical misadventure," to a 
schedule of specific covered outcomes which is capable of being changed as 
necessaty. The recommended schedule, Causes 0/ Personal Injury, is based in 
part on the International Classification of Diseases of the World Health Organi-
zation.29• It omits reference to "accident" because of the intention to expand 
coverage to injuries or conditions not necessarily caused by accident.291i 
One of the major proposed effects of the change to a schedule would be that 
a limitation which the courts had placed on the term "medical misadventure," 
to the effect that a "recognized risk" of a particular therapy was not covered, 
289 [d. para. 177 (Draft Act § 53). 
290 [d. para. 176. It is not clear whether the one-third victim's share includes hospital and 
surgical expenses as well as expenses of physician's individual medical treatment. The illustration 
used to justify this figure was taken from the experience with ACC payments for individual 
practitioner visits, which had evidently been about one-third less than usual fees. [d. para. 174. 
Evidently this practice of setting payments lower than usual fees has recently been struck down in 
the courts, which have required ACC to pay the full fee to the extent it is "reasonable by New 
Zealand standards." 
191 ld. para. 178. 
292 Id. 
293 [d. para. 175. 
294 [d. paras. 165-166. The "First Schedule" (so denominated to distinguish it from the table 
of Motor Vehicle Levy Rates, which is the Second Schedule) may be found id. paras. 166-194. 
29& [d. para. 166. 
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would be eliminated.z9G Funher, getting or failing to get informed consent 
would "no longer be relevant," since if the particular outcome were included in 
the schedule the victim would be covered regardless of whether the patient had 
been informed of its possibility and had consented. 297 
Other changes recommended include omitting a limitations period (currently 
within one year from the date of the accident or the death)298 and giving cover, 
not available under the current scheme, to incapacity manifesting itself after 
1974 although caused before that date. 299 By way of example, this would fur-
nish coverage for asbestos-related occupational disease caused by exposure prior 
to 1974,300 for injuries which manifested themselves after 1974 but which were 
caused by pre-1974 accidents,301 and for sexual abuse of a child which occurred 
prior to 1974 but for which the emotional harm appears thereafter. 302 
2. Funding 
The Law Commission recommends changes in the manner in which Compo is 
funded by eliminating different rates of annual levy for employers and self-
employeds engaged in different industrial activities and instead adopting a flat 
rate, estimated to be about $2.64 per $100 of payroll.303 Experience rating of 
employers, self-employeds or of motor vehicle owners or drivers would not be 
attempted and provisions in the Act allowing bonuses and penalties would be 
removed.30• Levies upon owners of motor vehicles would instead be based upon 
the current two-rate strucrure, $100 or $35.30, which is based largely on size of 
vehicle, and the levies would be adjusted in the future according to changes in 
296 ld. para. 165. 
297 ld. 
298 Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 98. 
299 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30 paras. 167-171. 
300 This provision would only extend the current coverage of occupational diseases. See Acci-
dent Compensation Act, 1982, § 28. The Law Commission did not recommend the extension of 
coverage of Compo generally to man-made non-occupational diseases, See generally SECOND 
WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, First Schedule at 166-95, although a few environmental 
hazards seem co be inclpded. See id. at 172-74 (accidental poisoning by other solid and liquid 
substances, gases, and vapours), id. at 189 (exposures co radiation), id. 190 (exposure co Noise 
(pollution, sound waves, and supersonic waves). The failure adequately co cover man-made dis-
eases has been criticized as a serious failure of both the core system and New Zealand's Compo. 
See]. STAPLETON, supra note 3, at 145-50. 
301 The example given is of spinal accidenrs. SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, 
para. 167. 
302 ld. 
303 [d. para. 250. 
304 Id. paras. 140-148. 
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the consumer price index.3011 In addition, a portion of the excise duty paid on 
motor vehicle fuel and ordinarily not used for the road system would be used to 
support the compensation scheme.306 
From the perspective of general deterrence, perhaps the most significant ele-
ments of the Law Commission recommendations regarding funding are those 
that assert that the various levies are not premiums to fund an insurance system 
but taxes to fund a social welfare program.307 In accordance with that view, the 
Commission has recommended that henceforth the strict separation of the ex-
isting three accounts-earners, motor vehicle, and supplementary-be weak-
ened and that moneys received from all sources be intermingled in a single fund 
to provide for Compo benefits and ACC administrative expenses without regard 
to the source of the accident.308 To sever the relationship between accident 
causers and accident costs even further, the Commission has recommended that 
"as with other taxes Parliament should directly exercise its constitutional func-
tion of determining from time to time the rate of the particular levies.' '309 This 
would provide the government with "the general opportunity each year to 
make an overall assessment, against the Corporation's estimate of its needs, of 
the amount to be gathered from the three or four sources and the balance that 
should be struck between them. "310 
Under such a system it would seem to follow that in the future shortfalls 
produced by excessive or unexpected accident costs would not have to be fi-
nanced by sharp increases in employer or driver levies. Instead, the government 
would have the responsibility of providing the needed funds and could, if it so 
desired, simply draw them from general tax revenues, thus blunting the kind of 
outcry from levy payers that generated the 1986-87 crisis. 
3. Accident Prevention 
Although it reaffirmed the view of the Woodhouse Report and the Accident 
Compensation Act that the most important way to deal with personal injury 
accidents was through prevention,3ll the Law Commission's report ultimately 
rejected any significant role by way of deterrence or prevention for the compen-
305 Id. para. 241. 
306 Id. para. 240. The Commission's justification for applying a portion of the fuel tax is that, 
.. [g)iven that this particular tax is directed at road users and in particular had some regard to the 
extent of their use and their exposure to the risk of accidents, it does appear to us to be an 
equitable and efficient means of providing funds for the accident scheme." Id. 
307 Id. para. 243. 
308 Id. paras. 242-249. 
309 Id. para. 244. 
310 ld. 
311 ld. paras. 105-106. 
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sation scheme. After acknowledging "the widely held opinion that [the promo-
tion of safery is} not adequately handled in our system of govemment,"3l2 the 
Commission's principal response was to propose that a Minister of Safery be 
appointed and placed in charge of the entire field of safery.813 
To arrive at its relatively relaxed and non-urgent response to the problem of 
accident prevention, the Commission first found it necessary to confront the 
problem of increasing costs314 and to deal once again with the question whether 
elimination of tort liabiliry for personal injuries might also have eliminated ef-
fective deterrence. 
Curiously, although the possibility was brought to its attention,3U the Com-
mission in its report never explicitly mentioned that an increase in the rate or 
severiry of accidents might have accounted for some of the mysterious cost 
creep. Rather, it relied on a study conducted by actuaries at the Commission's 
request3l6 which itself never suggested such possibiliry. In the study the authors 
identified an "unexplained expenditure growth" from 1975-76 to 1984-85 of 
about fifty percent or more.3l7 They downplayed the importance of the increase, 
however, by stating that the annual growth rate-about 4.6 percent per 
year-"is similar to or lower than the average rates of unexplained cost increases 
observed by many Australian workers compensation and compulsory third parry 
schemes in the same period."3l8 In response to the question whether it is possi-
ble to isolate any causes for the unexplained increases, the actuaries responded 
by suggesting several possibilities other than a worsening accident problem.3l9 
312 Id. para. \04. 
313 ld. para. 128. 
314 See Jupra text accompanying notes 172-80. 
315 See, e.g., Submission to Law Commission, Jupra note 14; Miller, Plugging the ACC'J BiggeJt 
Leak, Nat'l Bus. Rev., July 24, 1987, at 17, col. I. Evidently, other than the Author's, none of 
the many submissions to the Law Commission showed any interest in a return to the tOrt system. 
Letter from Jeffrey O'Connell to Richard S. Miller (August 16, 1988) (reporting on communica-
tion from the Law Commission). Since then, however, an article in a New Zealand journal has 
proposed the reinstatement of the tOrt action as a supplement to regulation controlling hazardous 
technology. Hide & Ackroyd, Liability and the Control of HazardouJ Technology, 1988 N.Z.L.). 
277. See also text infra accompanying notes 397-404. 
316 Cumpston & Madden, Report on the COJU of the Accident CompenJation Scheme, in SECOND 
WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30, at 196 app. C. 
But Jee Hide & Ackroyd, Liability and the Control of HazardouJ Technology, 1988 N .Z.L.). 
277 (describing statutes regulating hazardous technology and characterizing them as providing 
"considerable scope for comprehensive conttOl" but nevertheless proposing reinstitution of a civil 
action for personal injury). 
317 They also explained that if, over the nine year period, lump sum payments and ERC 
payments had not kept pace with inflation, as was probably the case, then the unexplained in-
crease "would probably be higher than the 50% estimated .... " ld. at 205. 
318 Id. 
318 These were: (1) as to increases in weekly benefits, from increased unemployment, especially 
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As to the possibility of reintroducing the tort system, the Commission in 
effect reaffirmed the views of the Woodhouse Report, upon which Compo was 
originally based, that tort liability fails both as a deterrent to accidents and as a 
compensation system.320 In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission noted 
that "much recent American writing addresses the 'torts crisis,' 'the failure of 
tort law' and the related 'insurance crisis,' "321 but drew its main support from 
"the prevailing view of leading commentators on civil liability for personal in-
jury{,}" particularly Professor Andre Tunc,322 as buttressed by Professor Craig 
Brown's study of automobile accidents and fatality rates in New Zealand.323 
Apart from the fact that not all leading commentators on civil liability neces-
sarily share Professor Tunc's view of the failure of tort law as a deterrent,32. the 
validity of Professor Brown's study as general support for that view beyond the 
motoring context, as he himself was careful to note,3211 is not established. In-
in rural areas, and from a change in § 59(2) of the 1982 Act whereby those earners who suffer 
temporary panial disabiliry but who cannot find work do not have their ERC reduced by the 
amount of earnings they might have had if they could have found work; (2) as to increases in 
lump sum payments for noneconomic loss for permanent loss or impairment of bodily functions, 
from an increase in the maximum from $7,000 to $17,000 which commenced in April, 1983; 
(3) as to increases in the lump sum payments for pain and suffering or loss of amenities of life, 
from "the increased tendency to award maximum or near maximum amounts for relatively minor 
impairments;" (4) as to increases in medical payments, from increasing costs of various medical 
and paramedical services plus "some continuing tendency to charge the Corporation for non-
accident related treatment"; and (5) as to increases in hospital payments, panly from general 
medical cost increases and panly from greater use of private hospital facilities. Id. at 208-09. 
Neither an increase in accidents or their severiry nor an increase of fraudulent or false claims 
(except, perhaps, for the charges for non-accident related treatment) was mentioned. Professor 
Gellhorn suggests, however, that "means can and should be developed" effectively to control 
professionals and others to whom the state has given licenses and to encourage greater care in 
other areas, such as driving and construction, as well. Letter from Walter Gellhorn to Richard S. 
Miller, Aug. 15, 1988 . 
•• 0 WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jllp,.a note 10, paras. 78-113 . 
• 21 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, lupra note 30, para. 79. 
'22 Identified in the repon as a scholar who, in the 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAw ch. 14 (1983 & Supp. 1986), flady rejected fault as the basis for determining 
compensation. Id . 
••• Brown, lup,.a note 3 . 
••• See, e.g., Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, 37 PRoc. ACAD. POL. SCI. 18, 29 (1988); 
Henderson, lup,.a note 3; Posner, Can Lawye,.1 So/tie the Prob/eml 0/ the To,.t SyJlem?, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 747, 749-51 (1985). 
"6 Professor Brown in his anicle clearly aniculated the reasons why the negligence system is 
not a major factor in deterrence in the automobile accident context as compared with other areas. 
Brown, lup,.a note 3, at 978. 
In his study of road accidents, Professor Brown did not mention one factor which, in the 
motoring context, may have more than substituted in New Zealand for any general deterrence or 
internalization of COStS produced by liability insurance premiums: the highly and anificially in-
flated prices of automobiles in New Zealand. Probably because of customs duties, car prices there 
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deed, to the contrary, he has stated: "Despite the protection provided by liabil-
ity insurance, the deterrent effect of negligence law remains strong outside the 
context of motoring. "328 And both Professor Brown and the Law Commission 
agreed that the absence of comparable statistics with regard .to unintentional 
injuries outside of the driving context made it impossible to present evidence of 
the effect of eliminating tort liability on accidents in areas other than automo-
bile accidents.327 
Nevertheless, the Law Commission rejected any return to tort liability for 
personal injury and, having done that, proceeded also to reject most other finan-
cial safety incentives, both existing and proposed,328 and includlng the current 
distinctions based on employee injuries among 103 industrial activities.329 
As to the safety incentives which might be lost by giving up bonuses and 
penalties and by rejecting experience· rating, the Law Commission argued that 
on the one hand these so-called incentives are not effective and on the other 
are many times higher than they are in the United States, whether the differences in the values of 
the rwo currencies (the New Zealand dollar was worrh berween $0.56 and 0.59 U.S. at the time) 
are taken into account or not. Thus, for example, the adverrised prices for used au£Os in the 
Dominion Sunday Times of July 19, 1987, at 40, included the following: 1986 Mazda RX7, 
$73,000; 1983 VW Scirocco GT, $23,990; 1986 Honda Civic, $23,990; 1984 Honda Accord 
3-dr., $23,500; 1984 Mazda 626, $22,990; 1986 Chevrolet Camaro, $84,990. While the de-
mand for automobile transporration may be highly inelastic, these awesome prices arguably could 
not have helped but reduce the overall driving acriviry in New Zealand over what it might have 
been if only market forces dicrated prices. On the other hand, it is also possible that the fantastic 
prices of new and nearly new au£Omobiles has led £0 excessive driving of older and hence less safe 
vehicles. (For example, the author, in February of 1987, paid about $7,000 for a 1974 Triumph 
Saloon; at home in Honolulu the author's oldest car in 1987 was a 1981 Subaru.) 
If the prices of au£Omobiles were about as high in relation to the cost of living in New Zealand 
before 1974, when Compo came into force, as they were after that date, then this facror would 
not affecr Professor Brown's conclusion, based mainly on comparisons of injuries per mile driven, 
that the advent of Compo did not cause an increase in motor vehicle accidents. However, the 
high price of automobiles in New Zealand would affecr the accuracy of comparisons with. road 
accident rates in other countries (and in New Zealand if au£O prices were relatively lower before 
1974) in rwo ways: First, high au£O prices would arguably chase younger drivers-who often 
account for a disproporrionately high percentage of accidents-out of the car-buying market. 
Second, the high cost of automobiles might significantly reduce the total number of miles driven 
in New Zealand as compared with nations with lower prices. The first factor would improve New 
Zealand's rate of injuries per mile driven and the second would improve its per capita rate of 
injuries. Thus, comparisons of motor vehicle injury rates berween New Zealand and nations that 
retain torr liabiliry which indicate similar rates of accidents per mile driven or per capita may not 
accurately reflect an adverse effecr on accidents produced by elimination of the torr acrion in New 
Zealand . 
•• e Brown, Jupra note 3, at 978. 
827 See Brown, Jupra note 3, at 980; SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30, para. 80. 
828 See Jupra text accompanying note 305. 
329 See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, Jupra note 30, paras. 250-269. 
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hand there are other more effective safety motivations and strategies either in 
place or available for adoption. Some elaboration of both of these arguments 
seems warranted here. 
a. Inadequacy of Incentives 
As to the ability of variable levies-adjusted according to the accident costs 
of work-related accidents of employees in each class of industrial activity-to 
produce deterrence, the Law Commission argued, quite convincingly, that un-
less a particular employer enjoys a monopoly, its ability to lower the levy for its 
industrial class is very much in doubt; levies could only be decreased if the 
overall worker accident cost for all firms engaged in the same activity were 
lowered. Thus, the hope of reducing such levy by reducing a company's own 
accident costs is unrealistic. 330 . 
As the Commission itself noted,331 however, variable levies by industry are 
different from bonuses and penalties on individual companies and from experi-
ence rating of individual companies. But these, too, the Commission found to 
be seriously flawed. The problems discussed included (a) difficulties of 
scale-most New Zealand companies employ 100 or fewer workers, while the 
minimum base of employees necessary for accurate merit rating is in the 
thousands; it is unfair to penalize some small firms and to give others bonuses 
based on safety records which are based on too few incidents to determine with 
accuracy the relative safety of such enterprises; (b) difficulties of time lag, 
whereby penalties or bonuses or new ratings may be imposed long after the 
situation which engendered them may have changed, for the better or worse; (c) 
difficulties of prediction, contributed to by the time lag, since employers will 
not be able to measure or predict the effects of their safety decisions on bonuses, 
penalties, or ratings; prediction will be particularly difficult and potentially un-
fair if accident costs, rather than frequency, are used as the base (as they now 
are in setting levies) since the costs of particular accidents may be fonuitous and 
since some accident costs, such as those dealt with only by the public hospital 
system, are not included in the base; (d) difficulties of under-reponing, as where 
employers discourage the reponing of accidents in order to avoid penalties or to 
keep their ratings low; and (e) difficulties in creating incentives where, as in 
past practice, the bonuses or penalties tend to be small.332 
SSO Id. paras. 13 7 -138. 
SSI Id. paras. 138, 140. 
sss Id. paras. 140-149. In reaching these judgments the Law Commission relied on a recent 
repon of the Economic Council of Canada, Chelius & Smith, The Impact 0/ Experience Rating on 
Employer Behavior: The Case 0/ Washington State, in SEVENTH ANNUAL SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC 
ISSUES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1987), sponsored by the National Council on Compensation 
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b. Other Sajety Incentives 
In view of these problems with bonuses, penalties, and experience rating, the 
Law Commission expressed a strong preference for imposing penalties "by refer-
ence to observed conditions[;}"333 that is, by using inspectors who have the 
power to assess penalties, in the manner of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA)334 in the United States. The Commission, however, did not make 
any specific recommendation as to whether the power should reside in the ACC 
since the government had yet to decide whether to create a separate .. one Act -
one Authority" occupational safety program like OSHA for New Zealand.33& 
What is particularly interesting is the Commission's views as to where, ab-
sence tort liability and the specific prevention strategies it rejected, it believes 
incentives for safety emerge under the amended regime it is recommending. In 
its report the Commission summarized its views in a section entitled "Safety 
incentives in general."336 
First, the Commission asserted that the safety incentives of workers and em-
ployers will be increased by adding one week to the current one week delay 
after injury before Compo benefits become payable.337 This incentive may well 
discourage false claims by workers who might otherwise be tempted to use 
Compo to finance a two-week hunting trip, or other vacation, by feigning an 
off-work injury and may also serve as an inducement to workers to exercise 
greater care off the job, since only earners who suffer on-the-job accidents must 
under the proposed amendments be paid earnings for their second week by 
their employers. With respect to work-related accidents to their own employees, 
therefore, the principal new incentive of having to bear an additional week of 
wages will be on employers, who will thus have an increased incentive to pre-
vent worker accidents. 
Second, the report refers to self-interest of individuals, in the varying contexts 
where they may suffer accidents, and especially of employers, who may "as a 
result of accident ... lose the services of a skilled experienced employee"338 or 
suffer other direct costs such as property damage, interruption of production, 
Insurance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and on 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS 
COMMITIEE, supra note 85, at 56 (reporting that the safety incentive bonus program ceased 
"partly because of data deficiencies, partly because of the difficulty of determining berter perform-
ance, and primarily because no link could be found between bonuses and improved prevention 
performance"). 
S3S SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 148. 
ss, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.c. §§ 651-678 (1970). 
336 See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 148. 
336 [d. paras. 13 1-149. 
337 [d. para. 132. 
S3S [d. para. 133. 
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loss of profits, or other consequential damage. At this point the report recog-
nizes that for the employer many of these losses will be covered by loss insur-
ance. Rather than asserting that the existence of the ability to spread a risk 
through insurance weakens deterrence, as is the position consistently taken with 
regard to liability insurance, the Commission states: 
(The total of fire and accident premiums in New Zealand is considerably in ex-
cess of Accident Compensation levies.) Accordingly, such incentives as an insur-
ance policy may provide through experience rating, accident prevention (by in-
creasing premiums if safety measures are not taken), no claims bonuses, and the 
like are already relevant to many accidents that may also cause personal injuty.339 
It is reasonable to ask why the Commission believes these financial incentives 
produced in the case of accidental injury to property should be any more effec-
tive than the Commission has asserted they are when applied to accidental in-
jury to person. 
Third, the Commission asserts that the prospects of accident costs to their 
business property or profits has led some businesses to adopt sophisticated safety 
programs which not only enhance safety but produce better relations with em-
ployees and improve production and generally lower costS.340 
Fourth, there is a "growing acceptance of the need for methods for the pro-
motion of workplace safety involving cooperation between all involved. "341 This 
has led to legislation which provides for the development of voluntary safety 
codes.342 It is also "part of a world-wide movement towards greater worker 
participation in occupational health and safety. "843 
The fifth incentive merits direct quotation: "Unsafe methods of work or 
products which cause damage to property outside the work place can be the 
subject 0/ civil actions in the courts by those damaged. Again[,J insurance may 
have a role. "344 
Here, the inconsistency between the Law Commission's deprecatory view of 
the efficacy of the civil action for personal injury damage cum liability insurance 
as safety incentive and its positive view of the safety incentives engendered by 
law suits to recover for property damage seems inexplicable. 
Sixth, there are incentives for safety for professionals and others in discipli-
nary processes which "will be significant in some situations. "345 In such situa-
338 Id. 
340 Id. para. 134. 
341 Id. para. 135. 
342 Id. 
348 Id. 
344 Id. para. 136 (emphasis added). 
345 Id. 
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tions, unlike those which give rise to law suits, there will be no insurance avail-
able to weaken the incentive to safety.346 
Seventh, "much safety legislation imposes standards and rules which can be 
supervised and enforced through inspection, courts and commissions of inquity, 
and prosecution in the criminal courts. "347 
Eighth, in some situations those who cause injuries to others may be prose-
cuted for a crime such as manslaughter in the criminal courtS.348 
D. The Effect 0/ the Law Commission's Recommendations 
Viewing the specific changes the Law Commission has recommended, it can 
be concluded: 
First, that the Law Commission has, in practical effect, rejected any serious 
role in accident prevention for the ACC and the Compo scheme. Any deterrence 
that may be added by transferring responsibility for the second week of disabil-
ity to the employer or, for non work-related accidents, to the employee, is mi-
nuscule, especially when compared with the externalization effects of (1) turning 
all medical expenses of accidents over to Social Security; (2) extensively disasso-
ciating the sources of funding and the accounts from which benefits are paid 
from any correlation with the costs of accidents; (3) adopting a flat-rate system 
for employer levies; (4) rejecting bonuses, penalties, and experience rating for 
employers and auto owners and rejecting any levies on drivers; and (5) generally 
recommending that levies be considered to be taxes and that government, rather 
than the ACC, be given the responsibility for raising them not only from ex-
isting sources but from motor vehicle fuel taxes and from general revenues, as 
well. Indeed, the Commission has suggested the placement of safety responsibil-
ity elsewhere (in a new Safety Minister and staff), has eschewed any desire to 
impose the costs of accidents on those persons and activities who cause them,349 
and has conveyed the view that Compo is, or should become, a pure social 
welfare program funded by general taxation. 360 
Second, that the Law Commission's recommendations with regard to benefits 
will significantly increase the overall costs of the scheme, notwithstanding the 
elimination of existing lump-sum payments for noneconomic losses, by ex-
tending vety expensive periodic payments based on degree of disability and 
New Zealand's average weekly wage to non-earners who are not now entitled to 
such payments; by equalizing medical benefits for illness victims with those 
a.8 Id . 
• ., Id . 
• 48 Id . 
• 49 Id. paras. 256-257. 
36. See, e.g., id. para. 44. 
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provided under Compo for accident victims; by extending Compo to cover vic-
tims of occupational and other injury-causing events that occurred prior to 
1974, the manifestations of which did not occur until after 1974; and, possibly, 
by also extending coverage to victims of congenital diseases. It is clear, however, 
that by removing the payment of health-related costs from ACC's responsibility 
and shifting it to Social Security, costs of the Compo scheme will, to that sig-
nificant extent, appear to be reduced. 
Third, that while costs will increase significantly, the political outcry that 
might otherwise ensue from levy payers under the current scheme will be muf-
fled initially by adopting a single flat rate for employers3111 and ultimately by 
shifting most of the increased costs onto general taxation. 
Thus, the expansion of Compo as envisioned by the Law Commission may 
from its perspective seem humane and consistent with its underlying princi-
ples. 3112 Unfortunately, the problems not resolved and probably exacerbated by 
the report's recommendations include a worsening accident situation and the 
not unrelated cost creep. The latter, in view of New Zealand's difficult eco-
nomic situation,3113 will probably make it impossible over the long run to ad-
here to the principle of real compensation and will surely prevent the achieve-
ment of comprehensive coverage of all disability. 
It has been suggested that to criticize Compo because it does not provide 
comprehensive coverage for disability caused by illness as well as accident or to 
resist wider coverage, as recommended by the law Commission, on the same 
grounds, is to make the best the enemy of the good.3114 The fact is, however, 
that when the larger economics of New Zealand are considered,31111 costs of the 
accident scheme as expanded according to the Law Commission's recommenda-
tions and as increased by uncontrolled accidents could become the enemy of 
Compo itself and not just of efforts to expand the protection of those with 
361 However, those employers who previously paid less than the new flat rate may very well 
oppose the change. Indeed, the proposal for a flat-rate levy evidendy drew significant opposition 
from employers in industrial activities which were paying less than the $2.50 rate earlier recom-
mended by the Commission. See id. para. 253. Their opposition may be muted by the fact that 
no such levy payer would end up paying more than twice its prior levy. The changes that gave 
rise ro rhe uproar in the first place, however, were as high as 500 percent. 
362 Indeed, the recommendations in some respects simply reassert ideas, such as flat rate levies 
and periodic payments for disabled non-earners, originally put forth in the Woodhouse Report 
but never implemented. See WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, paras. 441, 467-468. 
363 See, e.g., Hayward & Sherwell, Markets Descend into Gloom Following Douglas'S Departure, 
Financial Times, Dec. 15, 1988, at 6, col. I; McGurn, New Zealand's Painful Economic Cure, 
Wall St. J., Oct. II, 1988, at 22, col. 3; Richardson, Economies: Freedom to Fail, Far East Econ. 
Rev., Aug. 25, 1988, at 56, col. I; Sullivan, OEeD suggests cuts in weI/are, Dominion (Welling-
ron, N.Z.), June 2, 1987, at I, col. I. 
36" SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 3D, para. 61. 
366 See supra note 353. 
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illness-based disability. SIiS 
It seems to follow that much greater attention needs to be given to cost-and 
accident-containment than has been given by the Law Commission. Indeed, 
purely humane considerations seem to require considerably more attention to 
deterrence of accidents than the "let George do it" approach of the Law 
Commission. 
VI. TORT LIABILITY AS A BACK-UP FOR COMPO 
Not only is general deterrence of accidents in New Zealand virtually non-
existent, but specific deterrence-direct regulation of safety-is weak and inef-
fectual. 31i7 For example, there exists no comprehensive occupational safety and 
S~8 As co the lauer, it has been estimated that in Great Britain, for example, the incidence of 
incapaciry by disease and other causes not auribueable co accidents exceeds accident-produced 
incapacity by aboue ten times. See). STAPLETON, supra note 3, at 5-6. Ie has also been estimated 
by the Officials Committee that extending the scheme co those seriously disabled other than by 
accident would add about 21,500 persons eligible for the invalids' benefit plus an unknown but 
potentially large number who are currendy disqualified because of their spouse's income or who 
may be eligible for invalid benefits but have not applied. See 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMIITEE, 
supra note 85, at 14. The Law Commission itself stated that Compo only covers "a small propor-
tion of the disabled;' and cites a recent estimate that the ACC is only concerned with about one 
quareer of 416,000 persons disabled for a month or more. SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 30, para. 153. The COStS of extending ERC or, if they are not earners, periodic payments for 
permanent incapacity along with medical benefits approaching those now available to accident 
victims to these disabled persons would likely be monumental. Ie is understandable, therefore, 
why the Royal Commission on Social Policy, being concerned about overall welfare requirements 
in New Zealand, recommended extending the waiting period for Compo benefits to four weeks 
and replacing ERC after two years with a modest flat-rate payment. See id. para. 14. 
S07 See T. ISON, supra note 3, at 159-77. C/ SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, 
paras. 105-149; McBride, Safer Cars Forced on Motor Industry, NAT'L. Bus. REV .. July 2, 1987, at 
1 (proposal by trans pore undersecretary to require auto assemblers in New Zealand to comply 
with cereain overseas regulations on design; "New Zealand is alone among western democracies in 
not having minimum standards." Id; c/ Dominion (Wellington, N.Z.), July 20, 1987, at 2, col. 
5 (repore that the Government is granting $100,000 to the Ministry of Consumer Affairs "co 
carry oue its product safery work.. . for staffing, standard seuing and the investigation and 
testing of allegedly unsafe products .... {plus} $50,000 for the development and revision of 
standards") . 
The Fair Trading Act 1986 does permit actions for penalties against product manufacturers 
and sellers who sell products in violation of the Act. The maximum penalties, however, of 
$30,000 for individuals and $100,000 for corporations, id. § 40, fall far shore of possible tore 
damages for injuries caused by defective pcoducts. These provisions were not adopted until 1986 
notwithstanding the recommendation of Geoffrey Palmer, in 1975, to create a product safery 
commission to fill the gap in deterrence created by the externalization of accident COStS which 
attended the adoption of the Accident Compensation Act of 1972. Palmer, Dangerous Products 
and the Consumer in New Zealand, 1975 N.Z.L.). 366, 377-80. 
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health program under a single actSII8 and disciplinary procedures for health pro-
fessionals, which the Law Commission cites as an important safery incentive 
because actors are not insulated by insurance,sII9 is weak and seldom used. s80 
Agencies which might afford effective specific deterrence, however, require 
significant investments of public funds and large cadres of skilled employees, 
inspectors, and administrative staffs and are rarely financially self-support-
ing-even though they may have authoriry to impose fines and penalties. Fur-
ther, in order to reach the myriad sources of accident-causing behavior both 
within and beyond the occupational safery and health arena, such agencies 
would have to become both intrusive and coercive to a degree which is proba-
bly unacceptable to most New Zealanders. Therefore, the only system which has 
a chance of restoring effective deterrence and providing a significant new source 
of income to reduce the costs of Compo is the tOrt liabiliry system if tailored for 
use as a supplement to the accident compensation scheme. In my submission of 
May, 1987 to the Law Commission, drawing on the outlines of a suggestion 
previously offered by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell in connection with proposals 
for no-fault in the United States,S81 I recommended such a plan. Although the 
Law Commission in its final report in effect rejected any rerum to what it be-
lieved to be the discredited tort system,362 my proposal, as well as the joint 
response of Professors Brown, O'Connell, and Vennell to that proposal, remain 
relevant for the future both for New Zealand and for any other nation or state 
enticed to contemplate a comprehensive accident compensation scheme like 
Compo. 
A. The Author's Proposal 
Following are the essential features of my recommendation363 for reintroduc-
tion of the tOrt action for personal injuries as a supplement to Compo: 
1. The present accident compensation scheme, as it might be amended in 
3~8 SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 152. 
3~8 See supra text accompanying notes 340, 341. 
380 See Gellhom, supra note 3, at 196-202. 
381 O'Connell, Transferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers: New 'Sole Rem-
edy' Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. ILL. L.R. 749. See also K1ar, supra note 3, 
at 89, 102. 
382 See supra text accompanying notes 315-18. 
383 These have been modified slightly from the author's original proposal in his submission to 
the Law Commission. Essentially, however, the proposal remains the same. See Submission to Law 
Commission, supra note 14. Much of the detail included in the submission, including examples 
of how the system would work in practice, id. at 11-15, and how certain problems, such as how 
to allocate the right to settle a claim between the victim and the ACC, id. at 14-15, are omitted 
here in order not unduly to extend the length of this article. 
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response to recommendations currently before the New Zealand government, 
would remain the primary source of compensation for accident victims. 
2. The common law right to bring proceedings at law for damages for injury 
or death arising from an accident would be restored except in the case of actions 
by employees against their employers for work-connected accidents. S6" 
3. Every person eligible to receive benefits from the ACC would be deemed 
to have assigned to the ACC any tort claim he or she might have against any 
third person for personal injury or death damages, but only to the extent of the 
total value of the benefits he or she is entitled to receive both from the ACC and 
from other governmental sources, plus certain legal cOSts. 
Legislation giving effect to this assignment would be similar to the design of 
provisions found in some workers' compensation acts in which an employer is 
subrogated co the employee's tort claim against third parties to the extent of 
workers' compensation benefits paid by the employer or its insurer co the in-
jured worker.s6~ Preferably, the primary right to bring suit would be given to 
the ACC, with a right of the victim to intervene in the action. Regardless of 
who prosecuted the action, however, the ACe's assigned right would be pri-
mary and against the entire judgment; the victim would receive nothing from the 
tort recovery until the ACC's right to full reimbursement was satisfied. s66 
4. The existing right to prosecute actions for punitive damages in personal 
injury cases and to retain the damages would be transferred to the ACe. S67 
5. The right to receive lump sum payments for noneconomic loss under the 
Act would be abolished but could be replaced with periodic payments based on 
384 Not reviving employees' common law rights against their employers for work-related inju-
ries seems to be justified by the very special and continuing relationship between them and by the 
difficulties that are likely to arise in actions between them. However, either lump sum payments 
for noneconomic loss, (/ HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-12 (1985) (up to $15,000 allowed in cases of 
disfigurement), or, preferably, additional periodic payments to compensate for the non-earnings 
losses caused by disabiliry, see supra text accompanying notes 270-74, would be allowed as a 
tradeoff-as the payment of noneconomic losses now is-for the relinquishment of workers' com-
mon law rights against their employers. 
The right of action by employees against third parties would be revived, however, and the 
ACC would be assigned the employee's tort rights in that situation. 
386 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-8 (1985). 
388 As a condition of receiving Compo benefits, a beneficiary should be required to agree to 
cooperate with the ACC in the prosecution of its claim against the tortfeasor, much as an insured 
under a liabiliry policy is required to cooperate with the insurer in defense of a claim adverse to 
the insured. However, the right to recover damages in addition to Compo benefits, after the 
ACes rights are satisfied, might constitute a more effective incentive. 
387 Amounts received by the ACC by way of punitive damages would not be considered as 
reimbursement of ACC benefits paid or payable to the victim. Where the ACC fails to prosecute 
a claim for punitive damages within a certain period of time after the accident, however, the 
victim should be given that right and also be permitted to rerain the proceeds in that event. 
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degree of disability for all claimants. 888 
6. If there is concern about problems allegedly created by the common law 
system of tort liability, such as affordability and availability of liability insur-
ance, delay in payment, high transaction costs, excessively high judgments, 
overdeterrence, overburdening of the courts, unfair allocation of liability among 
joint and several tortfeasors, and the like, New Zealand is in an excellent posi-
tion to adopt specific measures designed to eliminate or mitigate them.889 
These might include: 
a. Eliminate jury trials. Under the New Zealand Judicature Act of 1908, 
jury trial in civil actions may lightly be dispensed with by the judge in certain 
cases;870 it would not be a major step to do away with it entirely in cases of 
injury by accident. 
b. Adopt alternative modes 0/ dispute resolution. Mandatory arbitration, crea-
tion of special administrative tribunals, or creation of dispute resolution centers, 
as in Japan,371 may be established either as substitutes or pre-conditions for 
He Workers have generally considered the lump sum payments for noneconomic loss as part of 
the tradeoff for giving up their common law right to recover for pain in suffering in favor of 
Compo. See G. PALMER, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION. Jupra note 3, at 223. Thus, any attempt to 
remove such payments without providing an equivalent, such as the periodic payments for per-
centage of loss of physical capacity, in addition to ERC, will predictably encounter stiff resistance 
from the labor movement. . 
38. See infra note 413 and accompanying text. 
In the author's view, the urgency of the need in New Zealand to restore the detertence pro-
vided by reintroduction of the common law action, whether in a much-modified or limited form 
or not, seems to outweigh the harm that might be caused by the possibility that some or all of 
these concerns have not been and cannot be sufficiently validated. 
170 Judicature Act of 1908, § (5), as amended. The court may order that a civil action be tried 
without a juty where the court determines that the trial "or any issue therein will involve mainly 
the consideration of difficult questions of law", id. at (a), or that the trial or any issue may 
involve "prolonged examination of documenrs or accounts" or "difficult questions in relation to 
scientific, technical, business, or professional marters . . . being an examination or investigation 
which cannot conveniently be made by a jury." Id. at (b) . 
• 71 See Miller, AppltJ I/J. PerJimmonJ - Let'J Stop Drawing Inappropriate CompariJonJ Between 
the Legal ProfmionJ in Japan and the United Stam, 17 VICT. U. WElliNGTON 1. REV. 201, 211-
12 (1987). 
An interesting experiment with mandatoty non-binding arbitration of all personal injuty ac-
tions where the amount claimed is less than $150,000 is undetway in Hawaii. Of particular 
interest is the artempt, evidently successful, to limit discovety costs. See Barkai & Kassebaum, 
The Impact of DiJcOtlery on COJt, Satiifaction, and Pace in Court-Annexed Arhitration, 11 U. HAW. 
1. REV. __ (1989). 
CoStS of public administration and the judiciary could be saved if the decision-making appara-
tuS were made self-supporting. For example, the traffic accident dispute settlement centers in 
Japan are financed by the liability insurance companies. Another possibility is to have the ACC 
fund the costS of administrative tribunals from recoveries received pursuant to the assignment of 
victims' tort claims. 
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common law trials. These should be made self-supporting, thus avoiding m-
creased costs of public administration and of the judiciary. 
c. Modify liability and damage rules. Since the primary role of the liability 
system would be deterrence, and since Compo would remain the primary source 
of accident compensation, appellate courts deciding upon appropriate rules for a 
reinstated liability system might feel free to ignore or downgrade risk-spreading, 
admirably handled by Compo, as a policy reason for expanding liability. an 
Damages in cases where liability is not necessarily based upon fault, as in ac-
tions to impose strict liability for defective products, might be limited to eco-
nomic losses suffered by the victim. a'la Damages in actions to recover only for 
negligent inAiction of emotional distress or for loss of consortium might also be 
limited to economic losses occasioned by the distress. a'l4 Damages might be 
m Compare Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 
( 1944 ) (Traynor, J ., concurring) (In [his seminal opinion urging [he adoption of stria liabiliry for 
defective products, Jus[ice Ttaynor said: "The cost of an injury and [he loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune [0 [he person injured, and a needless one, for [he risk of injury 
can be insured by [he manufaaurer and distributed among [he public as a COSt of doing busi-
ness. "). According [0 one thoughtful commentator, a significant cause of [he crisis in insurance 
availabiliry and affordabiliry in [he United States has been [he use of tort liabiliry for insur-
ance-risk spreading-purposes. See Priest, Underslanding Ihe Liability CriJis, 37 PRoc. ACAD. 
POL. ScI. 1960988); Priest, The Currenl Insurance Crisis and Modern Tori Law, 96 YALE L. J. 
1521 (1987); Priest, The LiabililY Crisis, YALE L. REP. 2 (Fall 1987). BUI see Letter from Michael 
J. Sacks, Lellers 10 Ihe Edilor, YALE L. REP. at 14 (Fall 1988). 
In Cf Ttaynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Protium and Sirict Liability, 32 TENN. L. 
REV. 363, 376 (1965). Traynor states that: 
Any system of enrerprise liabiliry or social insurance designed [0 replace existing tOrt law as 
the means for compensating injured parties should provide adequate but not undue com-
pensa[ion .... (01nce adequate compensation for economic loss is assured, consideration 
might well be given [0 establishing curbs on such potentially infla[ionary damages as [hose 
for pain and suffering. Otherwise, [he price of assured compensation could become 
prohibitive. 
Id. (cita[ion omitted). 
While not direaly apposite, Traynor's position would seem to support [he argument [hat in 
aaions based on stria liabiliry, which is a form of "en[erprise liabiliry," where adequate non-fault 
compensation is available damages should be limited [0 economic losses. 
Other more severe modifications might include eliminating stria liabiliry altogether and, in 
actions for negligence, insisting on proof of subjeaive fault or blameworthiness before awarding 
noneconomic losses. Cf U.S. ATTY. GEN'S TORT POUCY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT 
POUCY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POUCY IMPUCATIONS OF THE CURRENT 
CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABIUTY AND AFFORDABIUTY 30-33, 61-62 (1986). For other possible 
modifications of [he common law system, see REPORT OF THE ACTION CoMMISSION TO IMPROVE 
THE TORT LIABIUTY SYSTEM (1987). 
37< See Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Rwisiud: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensaling Byslanders 
and Relalives for Inlangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 477 (1984); Miller, The Scope of LiabililY 
for Negligenl Infliction of Emolional DiJlreJs: Making "The Punishmenl Fil Ihe Crime," 1 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 1 (1979). See also Ingber, Relhinking Inlangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAUF. L. 
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discounted for doubt; that is, explicitly reduced by the degree or percentage of 
doubt entertained by the fact finder as to whether the victim has proved his or 
her case. 3711 The rule of joint and several liability applicable to multiple 
tortfeasors might be modified in situations where particular classes of defend-
ants are found, after carefully srudy, to suffer a disproportionate share of the 
liability to which their actionable acts or omissions contributed.376 The rule 
should also be modified in cases in which the joint tortfeasor is immune from 
liability, as in the case of employers with regard to work-connected injuries to 
their workers. 377 
d. Enlarge the defense of assumption of risk. The defense of implied assump-
tion of risk, which in many jurisdictions in the United States has been elimi-
nated,378 or has been swallowed up by the defense of comparative fault, could 
be reinstated. Recovety would be barred if it were proved that plaintiff was 
fully apprised of the risk and made a truly voluntaty choice to encounter it in 
order to receive a benefit provided by the defendant. 
7. Liability insurance. Because Compo eliminates only personal injury actions, 
many enterprises already purchase property damage liability insurance. If a tort 
REV. 772 (1985). 
87& This would resemble the manner in which under comparative fault damages are reduced 
by the degree or percentage of the claimant's contributory fault. This reduction, however, could 
be separately applied to the plaintifFs case and to the defendant's affirmative defenses. C/ Nes-
son, The Evidence IJr the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. 1. 
REV. 1357, 1382-90 (1985)(explained but not necessarily approved by the author). It would be 
similar to, but not the same as, cases which allow ill plaintiffs who suffer injury from negligent 
failure to diagnose their illness to recover for the value of the chance that if the diagnosis had 
been correct they would have recovered. C/ McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc. 741 P.2d 467 
(Okla. 1987). See generally King, CauJation, Valuation, and Chance in PerJonal Injury Tom In-
volving PreexiJting ConditionJ and Future ConJequenceJ, 90 YALE L.]. 1353 (1981). As to similar 
issues in cases of man-made disease, see Rosenberg, The CauJal Connee/ion in MaJJ ExpoJure 
Cam: A "Public Law" ViJiol1 of the TlJrt SyJlem, 97 HARV. 1. REV. 849 (1984). 
878 I am thinking particularly of public entities and public utilities, for example. They are 
often the "deep pocket" defendants in motor vehicle accident cases and, when found slightly at 
fault in comparison with the driver, all too often end up paying most of the damages because the 
driver has inadequate liability insurance and other assessable resources. In the individual case this 
may not be a problem since, in theoty and in faer, the negligence of each defendant is a cause in 
fact or substantial faeror in producing the loss and each should be responsible for the entire loss. 
When this situation occurs in case after case, however, the deep pocket defendant who is a 
popular target may end up paying a grossly disproportionate share of the losses. 
877 See, e.g., Kamali v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 54 Haw. 153, 158, 504 P.2d 861, 864 (1972) 
(noting that the majority rule allowing limited contribution by a third parry defendant against an 
employer is based on "the proposition that it is unfair for one joint tortfeasor to bear the entire 
loss merely because the other joint tortfeasor is an employer"). See generally lARSEN, THE LAw OF 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.22, at 238 (1970). 
878 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1977) (COUrt abolished the 
doctrine of secondaty implied assumption of risk). 
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supplement to Compo were adopted, these enterprises would need to expand 
their coverage to include liability for personal injuries. In addition, many other 
actors, such as individual homeowners, landlords of rental property, and health 
professionals, who may not now be purchasing any general property liability 
insurance other than for their motor vehicles, will have to reenter that market in 
order to protect themselves against such liability for personal injuty. It will 
therefore become essential to keep premium rates reasonably low. 379 While the 
changes to the common law system suggested above might produce significant 
. savings, close regul~tion of rates, investments, reserves, and other insurance 
practices in order to avoid wide cyclical swings experienced in the United 
States,380 should be considered. On the other hand, the existence of a powerful 
State run insurance company, the State Insurance Office, which has acquired a 
significant part of the New Zealand general insurance market by virtue of its 
competitive premium rates and policy provisions,38l may serve to keep the rates 
for all competing insurers reasonably low without having to resort to further 
regulation. 
8. Experience rating. In order to enhance deterrence, determination of negli-
gence or other fault in tort actions and determinations of wrongdoing in traffic 
accident cases should be required to be taken into account in determining liabil-
ity insurance premiums.382 
Possible criticisms. It will surely be argued that a return to tort recovery, even 
as a supplement, will violate the principle of "complete rehabilitation" since 
claimants with tort claims will have reasons to maintain their disability until 
the tort action is resolved. Indeed, it will be pointed out that the problem of 
"litigation anxiety neurosis" was one of the Royal Commission's stronger argu-
ments for doing away with the personal injury action and adopting Compo in 
the first place. 383 It is doubtful, however, that a tOrt action could be a greater 
379 In the Woodhouse Repon, the plan was to use premiums formerly paid for workers' 
compensation by industry and the premiums paid by motor vehicle owners for liabiliry insurance 
under compulsory third parry insurance to help finance the accident compensation scheme. See 
WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, para. 312. With the ton system as a supplement, employ-
ers and motor vehicle owners paying levies will have to purchase bodily injury liabiliry insurance, 
as well, in order to protect themselves against financial calamity. 
380 See The Manufactured Crisis, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1986, at 544. 
381 See A. TARR, INSURANCE LAw IN NEW ZEALAND 34-36 (985). Tarr notes that rhe State 
Insurance Office has about 20 percent of the rotal fire and general insurance market, id. at 34, 
and berween 40-50 percent of the householders and motor vehicle insurance market, id. at 36. 
The State Insurance Office is governed by the State Insurance Act 1963. 
382 The Law Commission has evidently conceded rhat "such incentives as an insurance policy 
may provide through experience rating, accident prevention (by increasing premiums if safery 
measures are not taken), no claims bonuses, and the like " may constitute significant safery 
incentives. See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 133. 
383 WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, paras. 166, 118, 123-124. 
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incentive to maintain (and perhaps to falsify) disability than the prospects of an 
irreducible commitment to pay a permanently disabled victim up to 80 percent 
of his or her salary until retirement age. 384 But like determinations of perma-
nent incapacity, tort determinations are also not re-examinable once a final judg-
ment is entered or release signed. If streamlined modes of dispute resolution 
speed up the determination of fault, revival of the tort remedy would add little 
to the existing incentive to malinger and forestall rehabilitation. 
Next, it may be argued that restoration of the complex· machinery and issues 
of personal injury litigation would violate the principle of "administrative effi-
ciency." In regard to Compo, however, claims and payment procedures need 
not be different from what they are today. Thus, with regard to the heart of the 
no-fault scheme, victims would experience no change in the promptness of pay-
ment as a result of the tort system. If enforcement of assigned tort rights were 
to be handled by an entirely separate, self-supporting division of the ACC, no 
administrative costs would be added to Compo. 
While reinstitution of the tort remedy should not adversely affect the basic 
Compo scheme at all, it will be argued that the tort system would raise the cost 
of liability insurance to such levels that the combined costs of the tWO systems, 
operating in tandem, would impose an excessive burden on those compelled to 
contribute to levies and also to buy compulsory third-party insurance. There are 
several possible answers to this concern. First is the intent, mentioned above385, 
to keep premiums reasonably low by close regulation or by virtue of the exis-
tence of a State-run insurance company. Second, tort judgments would be used 
to reduce Compo's costs and these reductions would be passed on to those 
paying levies. 386 Third, both a principal purpose and planned effect of the tort 
384 Cf G. PALMER. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION. supra note 3, at 230 ("Another important prob-
lem with the pattern adopted in New Zealand lies in the serious consequences upon rehabilita-
tion. A person has an incentive not to go back to work in order to try and demonstrate that he 
has suffered a loss in his capacity to earn."). Under both the existing Act and the proposed Act, 
once a determination of permanent incapacicy it made, the determination may not be altered. 
Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 60(5); SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, § 
51(93), at 131. 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 381-82. 
388 In some cases of severe and permanent disabilicy the tortfeasor might agree to take over 
the ACC's responsibilicy to the victim entirely, by establishing an annuicy or irrevocable truSt. In 
additions, various arrangements between the ACC and liabilicy insurers, as suggested by Profes-
sors Brown, O'Connell, and Vennell, wherein agreements to gain immunity from cettain kinds of 
suits in exchange for substantial contributions each year to the ACC, might be also be tailored 
under this proposal. See J. O'Connell, C. Brown & M. Vennell, Reforming New Zealand's Re-
form: Accident Compensation Revisited 12-14 (Aug. 15, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) {here-
inafter Reforming New Zealand's Reform}. Admittedly, such agreements might become more 
difficult to work out if victims retained their rights to sue for tort damages not compensated by 
Compo. 
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backup is to reduce the number and severity of accidents; this reduction will 
result directly in reduced levies or, to the extent that Compo costs are paid from 
general revenues, in reduced taxes. Fourth, there are currently many accident 
causers, including health care professionals, land owners and occupiers, motor 
vehicle drivers, building contractors, product manufacturers, retail sellers, public 
entities and their various sub-units, organizations conducting athletic activities, 
among many others, who are contributing nothing except aJ general taxpayerJ to 
the diJabi/itieJ and miJ/ortuneJ they are cauJing to otherJ beyond themJelveJ and 
their own employeeJ. By spreading liability insurance premiums more equitably 
among all the groups who contribute to New Zealand's accident problem, the 
cost to each actor ought not to be excessive, except perhaps where a particular 
actor is appropriately surcharged for causing too many accidents. Further, it 
might be possible to achieve a reform sought by the Law Commission first by 
relieving all employers of levies to cover off-the-job worker accidents and then 
gradually moving to full funding of Compo, as with other social insurance pro-
grams, from general revenues,387 or a combination of general revenues and user-
pay fees. With that sort of change, employers would not view themselves as 
double-charged for Compo and for liability insurance. Finally, modifications of 
the tort system tailored to supplement a comprehensive compensation scheme, 
such as those mentioned above, could significantly limit the costs of litigation, 
the expenditure of attorneys' fees, and the percentage of the premium dollar 
expended for administrative expense. 
BenefitJ. The principal benefits of a tort supplement to Compo would be, 
first, to rekindle the motivation to take concrete steps for the safety of 
others-whether through fear of a law suit, a desire to avoid an increase in 
liability insurance premiums, or through widespread reassimilation of the norms 
of tort law-which has fled the consciousness of New Zealanders under Compo 
and, second, to reduce the incidence of unsafe activities through general deter-
rence produced by directing accident costs toward the activities which caused 
them. That the tort system may not perfectly allocate costs or that it may be 
relatively inefficient in doing so is not a governing consideration when faced 
with a situation, like New Zealand's, where little more than the forlorn hope of 
universal altruism and enlightened self-interest is left to motivate decisions, 
even of product manufacturers in other nations as well as local actors, to avoid 
accidents. 
Further, existence of a tort action may call attention to serious and festering 
dangers-as exemplified by recent controversies surrounding alleged failures in 
New Zealand to treat cervical cancer or to provide safe care at an orthopedic 
hospital-which in the absence of an incentive to sue may remain for long 
387 C/ SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, para. 228 ("{I}deally," supporting the 
scheme by general taxation, "is the right answer."). 
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periods of time unnoted.388 
Moreover, the public sense of justice will be enhanced if intentional, reckless, 
and grossly negligent accident causers are compelled to compensate their vic-
tims. Although actions for punitive damages may still be available in some of 
these situations,389 it may not be economically feasible in most cases to sue for 
punitive damages as they are currently limited by New Zealand law.390 
In addition, those people such as: non-earners, housewives, young people, 
and visitors who under current law receive little or no compensation for loss of 
earning capacity; victims whose injuries cause greater pain and suffering, disfig-
urement, and loss of amenities of life than can be compensated with a $27,000 
limit on noneconomic loss; and earners whose annual earnings exceed $63,458, 
the maximum amount on which ERC is paid, will be restored a remedy in the 
situation in which it is most fair to do SO:391 when the injury is produced by 
another's legally established fault. 392 
Another benefit of having the common law action assigned to the ACC is 
that if the ACC should create an enforcement arm composed of salaried lawyers, 
this will not only reduce the costs of litigation but could also serve to provide 
victims with legal representation for the ponion of the cause of action not as-
signed to the ACC.393 
388 Cf J. STAPLETON. DISEASE AND TIlE COMPENSATION DEBATE 120 (1986). Dr. Stapleton 
recognizes that personal injury litigation may have a role in providing publiciry, but argues that 
its role "based on the deterrent potential of publiciry seems ultimately unconvincing." Id. at 120-
21. 
It is interesting to note that victims of the alleged failure to treat cervical cancer have now 
brought tort actions against the physicians involved but are awaiting a ruling by the ACC, which 
has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine coverage, Accident Compensation Act, 1982, § 27(3), 
as to whether they may ptoceed with their actions or must accept Compo benefits. Letter from 
John Miller to Richard S. Miller (Nov. 25, 1986). It is not clear whether publiciry about the 
problem would have surfaced earlier if there had been a clear right to bring an action for medical 
malpractice. 
389 See supra text accompanying note 205. 
390 Id; cf Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and 
No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers' Compensation, 73 CAUF. L. REV. 857 
(1985) (urging cumulative remedies for non-physical harm to augment no-fault compensation). 
391 See Klar, New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's Perspective, 33 U. 
TORONTO L.). 80, 88 (1983). 
392 It should be noted, however, that should the current proposals by the Law Commission for 
periodic payments for loss of capaciry, see supra text accompanying notes 275-84, be adopted and 
be made available to earners as well as non-earners, then many of these serious inequities will 
probably be reduced or eliminated. 
393 New Zealand courts do not ordinarily permit contingent fee arrangements. Accident vic-
tims could thus ride the coattails of the ACC in situations where they could not otherwise afford 
to hire a lawyer to represent them in the action. 
There are obviously problems which will arise if the cause of action is split between the victim 
and the ACe. These include problems of settlement, problems of control of the litigation, and 
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Finally, a most important benefit will be to provide a significant source of 
funds to reduce the costs of Compo. These funds would come from successful 
enforcement of tort rights and consequent recapture of funds paid out and to be 
paid out by the ACe. They would likely amount to millions of dollars, quite 
possibly hundreds of millions of dollars, each year and thus could be Compo's 
salvation. 
Reintroducing tOrt liabiliry as a supplement is by no means a retrograde step 
if it is seen as a necessary device to improve accident prevention and to preserve 
and perhaps to extend an effective and compassionate compensation scheme of 
which New Zealand can be very proud. 
B. A Response 
While my recommendation to the Law Commission, as just described, was 
not accepted, it evoked a somewhat more positive response from Professor ] ef-
frey O'Connell and from Professor Craig Brown and Ms. Margaret Vennell, 
both New Zealanders.394 
First, these commentators expressed serious reservations about allowing tort 
actions for the full measure of damages along with a right to compensation, 
asserting concern that the assignment-the same as granting a right of subroga-
tion to a social agency-"raises prospects of waste and duplication of very large 
proportion . . . .' '396 They next express a preference for a no-fault system 
which replaces tort liabiliry, since they believe that granting no-fault benefits to 
victims who then retain the right to sue third persons for damages, as in the 
case of workers' compensation in the United States, subsidizes the tort action 
and leads to increases both in payouts-since the victim has little incentive to 
accept an early and relatively modest settlement-and in the number of third 
party actions.396 They inveigh against such "double dipping" and complain 
that my proposal does not set a threshold below which Compo recipients cannot 
attendant conflicts of interest. See Submission to Law Commission, supra note 14, at 14-15. 
These may raise issues and call for solutions similar to those which may arise berween workers 
and their employers in third party actions brought to recover damages also compensated by work-
ers' compensation benefits and in actions brought to recover for personal injury and properry 
damage where an insurer has paid to the insured the value of some or all of the damaged 
properry' 
394 Reforming New Zealand's Reform, supra note 386. Professor Brown currently teaches at 
the Universiry of Western Ontario; Margaret Vennell is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the Universiry 
of Auckland. 
395 ld. at 6 (citing Blum & Kalven, Public Law PerspectiveI on a Private Law Problem, 31 U. 
CHI. 1. REV. 641 (1964». 
396 ld. at 7. 
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bring their tort claim.397 They express fear that even without a contingency fee 
system in New Zealand my proposal might lead to a meteoric growth of tort 
claims in New Zealand, just as they have grown in other parts of the Western 
world, such as Canada, which do not permit the contingent fee. 39s Further, they 
even express doubt about the wisdom of providing the ACC with a right of 
subrogation while denying any separate right to pursue a claim to the victim 
who receives Compo benefits.399 
It is suggested, however, that the problems predicted are not likely to be as 
serious as the commentators suggest where Compo benefits are substantial in 
relation to a victim's earnings and cover most of the victim's medical expenses, 
since under my proposal the victim could only sue for those damages not com-
pensated for by Compo; the right to sue for compensated benefits would be 
exclusively the ACC's. Further, since the ACC's right to reimbursement from 
the tortfeasor is primary, in cases where liability is questionable or the tortfeasor 
has insufficient assets or insurance fully to satisfy a judgment, most or all of a 
negotiated sertlement or of the amount received on execution of the judgment 
would go to the ACC and the victim would have to be satisfied with Compo 
benefits. To put it another way, one of the great advantages of Compo is that it 
tends to be vety generous, at least to earners; the motivation to pursue an action 
to recover the difference between common law damages and the value of 
Compo benefits might not be nearly as great as it is under workers' compensa-
tion or automobile no-fault, where compensation is far less generous than 
Compo. 
Where Compo is inadequate, however, as it is today with regard to non-
earners, or where the potential tort award for noneconomic loss caused by the 
accident is great in relation to the payment expected from the ACC!OO there is 
evety reason to allow the victims to pursue their common law claim, and they 
will arguably have a strong incentive to do so. While a victim might indeed 
receive compensation both from Compo and from the tortfeasor, there will be 
no double-dipping in the sense of duplication or overlap of benefits.401 
The purpose of implementing a supplemental tort system, after all, is to 
restore the deterrence provided by the common law system. Keeping recoveries 
and actions within limits may be achieved, if necessary, by adopting some of 
the modifications of the system suggested above. 
39' Id. at 7-8. 
898 Id. at 8-9. 
899 Id. at 9-10. 
400 Either a lump sum under the current scheme or periodic payments based on percentage of 
disability under the proposed scheme. 
401 Indeed, to the extent the victim has received benefits from her employer to cover the losses 
of earnings or other expenses not compensated by Compo, she may have to reimburse her em-
ployer if she is successful in her tort claim. 
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In any event, having expressed their criticisms of my proposal, the commen-
tators then proceed to suggest an ingenious twist which, in effect, restores the 
ton action in its full glory unless the tort/easor agrees within ninety days after the 
accident to reimburse the ACC for the cost of Compo benefits.402 Initially, the ACC 
would be subrogated to the common law rights of the victim to the extent of 
the value of benefits paid and to be paid by the ACC to the accident victim. If 
the alleged tortfeasor refused to reimburse the ACC for those benefits, however, 
both the ACC and the victim would be permitted to pursue their tort claims.403 
Essentially, the principal difference between our proposals is that under the 
commentators' the tonfeasor can bar an action by both the victim and the ACC 
by paying the ACC the cost of its commitment to pay Compo benefits (or 
presumably by settling with the ACC) within ninety days of the accident. 
Under my proposal the victim could chose to pursue her action for damages in 
excess of her ACC benefits even if the tonfeasor sertled with the ACe. Thus, 
the commentators' proposal creates a powerful incentive for a tortfeasor to settle 
with ACC which, admittedly, mine does not. In addition to enhancing fair-
ness404 and increasing deterrence by allowing the victim to sue for un-
reimbursed losses, however, I believe that restoring a right in the victim to sue 
for noneconomic as well as other uncompensated losses, would likely be a neces-
sary condition to labor's giving up its right to lump sums for noneconomic loss 
under Compo.40& If, however, the Law Commission's current recommendations 
for adding periodic payments for incapacity is provided for non-earners and 
visitors and added to ERC for earners, then there should be less objection to 
removing the victim's right to sue if the ACC settled its claim with the 
tonfeasor. 
One further wrinkle, suggested by the commentators, is to allow victims to 
reject ACC benefits and instead to bring the common law ton action.406 Under 
401 This proposal is adapted, in tum, from one made by Professor O'Connell for adoption in 
the United States in cases of injuries by productS, health care, and other activities. Reforming 
New Zealand's Reform, Jupra note 386, at 10 (citing O'Connell, Balanced PropoJalJ for Product 
Liability Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.). 317, 328 (1987». 
403 [d. at II. 
404 See Klat, Jupra note 3, at 88 (assening that the elimination of the common law action has 
resulted in "grave injustice" for some victims, such as those injured by intentional or reckless 
conduct). 
406 See G. PALMER, ACCIDENT CoMPENSATION, Jupra note 3, at 228 ("(S)ection 120 has been 
the biggest source of contention under the Act during the fitSt four years. It has provided the 
Commission with perhaps itS most serious administrative headache. Now that lump sums are in 
the legislation it will not be easy to displace them. Their existence makes extension of the scheme 
to sickness problematic. ") 
406 Reforming New Zealand's Reform, Jupra note 386, at II n.27. Variations to the ton 
action were also suggested, such as only allowing recovery where the claimant proves defendant 
guilty of "gross or wanton conduct," requiring a heightened burden of proof, and making plain-
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the current Act this right seems justified because of the woefully inadequate 
benefits provided to non-earners and visitors, who are effectively deprived of 
their rights to reasonable compensation for their tort-based injuries by virtue of 
the level of benefits provided. If the Law Commission's new recommendations 
are accepted, however, the level of compensation for this group should improve 
considerably and the reason to provide such election should correspondingly 
diminish. 
Finally, while the commentators agree with my proposal that tort actions by 
workers against their employers should not be reinstated, they go further than I 
by expressing a preference not to reinstitute tort actions for automobile acci-
dents.407 They suggest that requiring motor vehicle owners to pay liability in-
surance premiums in addition to Compo levies would be politically unaccept-
able408 and they suggest that adequate deterrence might be achieved by "more 
individualized experience rating based on cooperation with the Ministry of 
Transport in shared data about the risk creating experience of individual motor-
ists . . . ."409 Unfortunately, as a result of life-time licensing,no levies which 
might be adjusted to reflect driving infractions cannot practically be imposed on 
drivers. Furthermore, motor vehicle owner levies are at a flat rate and also do 
not take account of the record of drivers of the automobile. In the face of these 
barriers to experience rating, I continue to believe that reinstitution of the tort 
action as a supplement to Compo is necessary to help deterrence to work in the 
increasingly dangerous driving context. 
While the differences in our proposals discussed above do not seem to be 
very great and are certainly not insurmountable, what emerges from the debate, 
at bottom, is that I and the commentators, who include so thoughtful and 
dedicated a critic of the tOrt system as Jeffrey O'Connell, have joined in sug-
gesting a modified reinstitution of that system in order to avoid the tragic con-
sequences of virtually total externalization of accident costs produced by the 
advent of Compo and the failure to develop an adequate system of specific 
deterrence to replace the tOrt action. 
VII. EXTRAPOLATING THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE TO OTHER NATIONS 
Because of its governmental structure as well as other conditions unique to 
the nation, its history, and politics, New Zealand's leaders found it relatively 
easy, in the early seventies, to adopt and implement a radical no-fault accident 
tiff and his lawyer jointly liable for defendant's attorney's fees. ld. 
007 ld. at 14-15. 
008 ld. at 14. 
008 ld. at 14-15. 
no See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 3D, para. 239. 
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compensation scheme and to abolish the personal injury action.HI New Zealand 
is a young democracy, a member of the British Commonwealth. Its parliamen-
tary system, originally modeled on England's, however, has been modified by 
eliminating the upper house. There is no Bill of Rights or other external written 
constitutional document which might inhibit development of a radically new 
scheme of dealing with accident costs. Thus, there exists a unicameral legisla-
ture, the English tradition of party loyalty, and a powerful Prime Minister 
elected by the members of Parliament of the party in power!I2 This system 
evidently produces something close to "unbridled power,"H3 enabling that 
party to enact its desired programs quickly with little or no modification. If 
there are significant checks and balances in the process of legislation, they must 
come from within the party. Yet there is recent evidence that the system ena-
bled the ministers in power, members of the Labour Party,414 to inaugurate 
conservative economic reforms such as "corporatization" of the government-
owned post office and post office bank and government-owned property, closing 
the coal mines, and selling off of publicly-owned industries and businesses, in-
cluding the Bank of New Zealand and Air New Zealand.HII 
The significance of such freewheeling power for the present inquiry is that 
the New Zealand government has the apparent ability, almost at will, both to 
legislate new safety systems to replace deterrence lost by doing away with tort 
actions and to tinker with Compo in order to achieve greater efficiency and to 
reduce abuses. In few Western nations is there likely to be a greater ability to 
establish and then to adjust the accident compensation and prevention systems 
• <1' See generally G. PALMER, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, supra note 3, 63-130. Even so, it took 
almost four years to get the Bill passed. [d. at 143. 
412 [d. at 63. 
<13 See G. PALMER. UNBRIDLED POWER 139 (2d ed. 1987) ("{I}n no United States legislature, 
and there are fifry-one of them, is it so easy to pass statutes as in New Zealand."); [d. at 219-20. 
[d. 
We lack the checks on those powers which are found in other countries-we have no 
written Constitution and no upper house. Instead, Parliament's law-making powers are 
exercised by a single House and by the Governor-General. The Executive almost invariably 
controls the House and the Governor-General is obliged by convention-except in the 
most extraordinary circumstances-to assent to Bills presented to him by the Executive. 
Thus, the Executive, through Parliament, has very wide powers to take away our most 
precious rights and freedoms. 
04 It is the Labour Party which has required ships entering New Zealand harbors to declare 
whether they are carrying nuclear materials. 
415 The program, known popularly as "Rogernomics" after the Finance Minister, Roger Doug-
las, was based largely on the same economic theories as "Thatchernomics" in Great Britain and 
"Reaganomics" in the United States. Recently, as the drastic and painful reforms seemed not to 
be producing the hoped-for economic improvement, Minister Douglas was dismissed from the 
Cabinet by Prime Minister Lange. See Hayward & Sherwell, Markets Descend into Gloom Follow-
ing Douglas's Departure, Fin. Times, Dec. 15, 1988, at 6. 
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in order to make them both work efficiently. If, then, New Zealand's Compo 
system has increased the cost of accidents to unacceptable levels-as I believe 
this paper demonstrates-and if the government has proved itself incapable or 
unwilling to adopt effective accident prevention mechanisms to substitute for 
the deterrence of the tort system-even though prevention has been explicitly 
assigned the very highest priority over rehabilitation and compensation-a pall 
is cast over the prospect that a more unruly democracy, such as the United 
States or any of its states, can ever substitute a reasonably generous no-fault 
accident compensation plan plus an effective accident prevention scheme for the 
current tort system along the lines being suggested by radical reformers in the 
United States.ue 
IX. FOR THE FUTURE 
Viewed from the broadest perspective, in developed Western SOClenes the 
problems of accident prevention and compensation are inextricably bound up 
with the larger problems of public health, poverry, and justice. A limitless vari-
ety of governmental and private instrumentalities and schemes, ranging from 
private charity at one extreme to the criminal justice system at the other, have 
evolved to deal with one or more facets of these interrelated problems. Usually, 
they operate interdependently, so that no one scheme can ever be identified as 
dealing only with a particular problem to the exclusion of all others. Often, 
since resources are limited, strong support for one scheme may undermine the 
effectiveness of others; each separate strategy is to that extent the enemy of 
other strategies. On the other hand, the combination of the various systems is 
synergistic; their combined effect is arguably greater than the sum of their indi-
vidual effects. In the developed common law nations the law of negligence and, 
more recently, the law of products liability, have been among the more promi-
nent instrumentalities in the mix of those that purport to deal with prevention 
and compeQsation. When New Zealand chose to scrap tort liability for personal 
418 See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 9. Of course, the ability of New Zealand, a nation of 
slightly more than 3,000,000 people, to adopt effective prevention mechanisms is significantly 
influenced by limitations on its resources; by contrast, the United States already has many power-
ful safety and illness prevention strategies in place both at the federal and state level. N evert he-
less, the New Zealand experience casts doubt on the prospects in the United States both for 
adopting no-fault compensation plans as substitutes for the tort system and adding the additional 
expensive strategies necessary to achieve effective prevention. The problem would be particularly 
difficult if some states desired to adopt a Compo-like program but others did not, thus weaken-
ing the possibility of uniform federal support. 
In any event, building a no-fault system that concentrates on accident victims to the ex~lusion 
of equally deserving victims of man-made disease and illness may be a mistake. See J. STAPLETON, 
supra note 3. 
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injuries in favor of a system of pure compensation, without at the same time 
inventing and imposing other injury prevention systems of equal efficacy, it may 
have weakened the synergy and thus unleashed an unacceptably large increase in 
accidents and their costs on the sociery. That is what the evidence presented in 
this paper suggests. 
Thus, Compo has evidently had the effect, gradually as its workings have 
become more dearly understood since its inauguration in 1974, of removing for 
everyone the inhibiting knowledge or understanding, as imperfect as it may 
have been at the time in New Zealand,'17 that, to put it in lay terms, my 
carelessness which threatens injury to others is likely to have unpleasant financial 
consequences for me and, even if it doesn't, it is against the law and not engaged in 
by good citizens. Arguably, the long term existence of tort liabiliry and the con-
comitant need to protect one's self by purchasing liability insurance builds a 
perspective for safety into each individual's subconscious mind without much 
regard to how effectively the system functions in fact to impose the costs of 
carelessness on the careless. 
If that is correct then the map for the future of Compo drawn by the Law 
Commission in its most recent report-expanding the benefits while further 
externalizing the costs-seems to urge movement very much in the wrong di-
rection. Instead, the greater need is to reintroduce the inhibiting influence of the 
tort system, as I and others have recommended. Indeed, reintroduction of that 
system could significantly reduce the costs of Compo, both by reducing accident 
costs and by removing costs of fault-caused accidents from the ACC, thus help-
ing to finance greater coverage for Compo in the future. 
For nations, such as the United States, which have tort liability systems in 
place, the message of New Zealand's experience has a negative and a positive 
aspect: First, it is naive to believe that it will be possible both to eliminate the 
tort system in favor of a compensation scheme and to re-create an adequate 
level of prevention by adopting effective administrative arrangements. Second, it 
may be possible at reasonable per capita cost to develop; through private insur-
ers, or even through government,418 a scheme of accident compensation which 
<17 For example, that compulsory liabiliry insurance premiums for motor vehicles in 1970 
were only $7.90 per year, Jee G. PALMER, ACCIDENT CoMPENSATION, supra note 3. at 83, suggests 
that risk of being held liable for substantial sums because of driver negligence must have been 
very low. 
<18 The COSts of administering Compo, a government plan, have been very low: "For each 
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covers, at least, a substantial part of lost earnings and other economic losses for 
persons suffering injury by accident, and to finance a part of the scheme by 
assigning tort rights of victims to the private or public provider. Adoption of 
such a scheme would solve the compensation problems often improperly attrib-
uted to the tort system. Agreements between the provider and the covered indi-
vidual, whereby, (unless the victim rejected no-fault compensation,) the acci-
dent causer would be released from ton liability if the latter agreed, within a 
certain period after the accident, to reimburse the provider for value of the 
benefits it is required to pay to the victim, along the lines urged by O'Connell, 
Brown, and Vennell, would funher reduce the costs of maintaining the deter-
rent aspects of the tort system. 
Perhaps it is time, in one or more of the laboratories we call states, to give 
such a plan a try. 
Because of its low cost and because' it was feared that turning the administration of Compo 
over to private insurers could increase tOtal annual costs by 32 to 69 percent (an estimate extrapo-
lated from prior COSts of workers' compensation insurance and third parry autOmobile insurance). 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION. PRELIMINARY PAPER No, 2, THE ACCIDENT COMPENSA-
TION SCHEME, A DISCUSSION PAPER 26. para. 126 (1987). the Law Commission did not recom-
mend turning Compo over to private insurers. See SECOND WOODHOUSE REPORT. 1upra note 30. 
paras. 46. 47. 
The Law Commission. however. did not consider the extent to which the low costs of adminis-
tration under Compo were due to failures to prevent abuses of the system such as fraudulent 
claims or claims for illness parading as accidents. Private insurers would arguably have a strong 
motive to prevent such abuses. Futrhermore. it was not appropriate to draw comparisons b~tween 
the ACC and private insurers administering systems in which liabiliry was based upon fault or 
upon the need to lind a connection between the injury and the claimant's work. 
